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PROPERTY AND RELATIVE STATUS
Nestor M. Davidson*
Property does many things-it incentivizes productive activity, facilitates exchange, forms an integralpart of individual identity, and
shapes communities. But property does something equally fundamental: it communicates. And perhaps the most ubiquitous and
important messages that property communicates have to do with
relative status, with the material world defining and reinforcing a
variety of economic, social, and cultural hierarchies.
This status-signalingfunction of property-withproperty serving as
an important locus for symbolic meaning through which people
compare themselves to others-complicates premises underlying
central discourses in contemporary property theory. In particular,
status signaling can skew property's incentive and allocative benefits, leading people to over-invest in status-enhancingproperty and
undermining welfare gains associatedwith trades aroundproperty.
Similarly, status signaling risks warping the link between property
and personhood, investing that connection with a potentially dysfunctional regardfor the property of others. And status signaling is
magnified by and can undermine property'scommunitarian links.
From a doctrinalperspective, ground-level property law intersects
with the problem of relative status across an array of areas of intellectual property, real property,and personalproperty.At times law
gives formal sanction to property's hierarchicalsignaling and at
times it tempers this tendency, breaking up fixed hierarchies.Sensitivity to these dynamics holds important lessons for both the
ongoing development of property law and for the continuing interdisciplinaryexploration of this core aspect of property.
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Insatiable ambition, the thirst of raising their respective fortunes, not so
much from real want as from the desire to surpass others, inspiredall men
with a vile propensity to injure one another and with a secret jealousy,
which is the more dangerous, as it puts on the mask of benevolence, to
carry its point with greater security. In a word, there arose rivalry and
competition on the one hand, and conflicting interests on the other together with a secret desire on both of profiting at the expense of others. All
these evils were the first effects of property,and the inseparableattendants
of growing inequality.

-Jean-Jacques

Rousseau'

INTRODUCTION: THE FIRST EFFECTS OF PROPERTY

The iPod Nano comes in several colors, which for a time included dull
industrial silver, as well as bright blue, green, pink, jet black, and red. Savvy
iPod owners understood at a glance that these colors corresponded to
amounts of memory-the black Nano, for example, having twice or four
times as much as the silver-and, not surprisingly, to how much each model
cost.

Suburban communities have long regulated land use to privilege singlefamily housing, typically with large minimum lot sizes, generous setbacks,
and extensive floor-area requirements. Although this tends to generate an
affluent homogeneity decried by planners and scholars, people are increasingly willing to take on unsustainable levels of debt and commute distances
that would once have seemed unthinkable to be able to say that they live in
such communities.
What do iPod colors and homes in far-flung, exclusionary suburbs have
in common? Each is an example of the ubiquitous role that property plays in
signaling relative status.' Despite a wonderful flowering of theoretical and
empirical property literature in recent years, legal scholars have largely ignored this critical aspect of property. This Article accordingly brings to the
fore status signaling through property, exploring its implications for contemporary property theory, and explaining the underappreciated role that the
design and operation of property law plays in both reinforcing and undermining property's hierarchical signaling tendencies.
To understand these dynamics, begin with the proposition that property
operates on several levels at once. On one level, property serves basic

1.

JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY 73-74 (G.D.H. Cole trans.,

Cosimo Classics 2005) (1755).
2. Status is a notoriously expansive term, so it bears a moment to clarify at the outset how
this Article employs it. Status in ordinary usage can simply, and neutrally, mean state or condition.
Henry Maine, by contrast, famously associated status with the concept of a rigid place in society and
the legal order, from which Western society has supposedly experienced progressive movement to
"free agreement" as the basis for social relations. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 163-65

(photo. reprint 2007) (Frederick Pollock, ed., 10th ed., Henry Holt & Co. 1906). This Article, however, deploys status in a third sense-status as relative rank or position. For convenience, then, the
Article will generally use "status" as a shorthand for this idea of comparative status.
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functions that are so familiar that we rarely pause to take note. Money enables exchange and investment; food provides sustenance; books entertain
and inform; buildings shelter a myriad of significant and trivial aspects of
life; and so forth. But all of these things-indeed all property, tangible and
intangible-work in other ways at the same time. Property forms an underlying and important aspect of the self, helping to shape personality and
individual autonomy. On yet another level, property serves as the connective

tissue for communities, defining mutual obligations and setting the boundaries of social relations. All of this is well recognized and the bulk of our
contemporary thinking about property falls roughly along these lines.3
Property, however, does something else equally fundamental: it communicates.4 In particularly potent ways, what we possess broadcasts

information about who we are and, most importantly, who we are in relation
to one another.5 Most people are quite adept at sending and deciphering

these signals, which can vary across cultures and contexts, often shifting
rapidly in their significance and particular meaning. Thus, beyond practicality, personhood, and community, property plays an overarching role in
shaping and reinforcing economic, social, and cultural hierarchies. Jet black

iPods and exurban McMansions might be great for playing music and keeping the rain out at night. They might also help us remember songs that are
particularly meaningful in our family or play out the rituals of our neighborhood's daily life. But a large part of why these things exist in the particular
way they do--and the value we place on them--comes from the status they
6

are commonly understood to confer.

This status signaling relates to but is ultimately distinct from the underlying material differences property generates. An unavoidable consequence

3.

See infra Part 1.

4. See Carol M. Rose, Introduction: Property and Language, or the Ghost of the Fifth
Panel, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 3-11 (2006) (discussing property as an expressive endeavor).
5.

Property, of course, communicates many messages that are not related to status or hierar-

chy. See MARY DOUGLAS & BARON ISHERWOOD, THE WORLD OF GooDs 4, 9 (1979) (discussing the

wide array of gestalt meanings that possessions can communicate, including finality, respectability,
and privacy). For further discussion of the varied meanings associated with property, see infra Section I.C.
6. Property must be understood here both in the sense of material and intangible goodsthe objects of property law-as well as property law itself. C.B. Macpherson, The Meaning of Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 1, 2 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978) ("In
current common usage, property is things; in law and in the writers, property is not things but rights,
rights in or to things."); see also id. at 6-9. While it is the objects of property law that most often
reinforce status, in a variety of ways property law itself drives status-related dynamics. See infra
Part IV. Indeed, even where status signaling is primarily a question of material culture-the resource
rather than the rules governing that resource-property law directly affects how that material culture
is formed and relevant resources allocated.
7.
See MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & EUGENE ROCHBERG-HALTON, THE MEANING OF
THINGS: DOMESTIC SYMBOLS AND THE SELF 30 (1981) ("[Status--or the ability to control meaning

in one's community--has become, to a certain extent, independent of other sources of control and
has taken on a life of its own. Wealth, political power, talent or physical prowess are still the stuff
from which status is made, but one can maintain or even gain status by manipulating its symbols for
one's own purposes. This is where the importance of things as status symbols lies."). In
HeinOnline -- 107 Mich. L. Rev. 760 2008-2009
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of any system of private property is that some individuals and groups will
inevitably have more property than others. Much can be said about the particular patterns of inequality that flow from the structure of property rights
at any given time and, conversely, the limits of redistribution consistent with
any basic conception of private property. But property relates to hierarchy in
a separate sense in the way that material possessions are not only unequally
distributed, but also used to mark and reinforce status boundaries. A house
in one neighborhood that is "objectively" quite similar to a house in another
neighborhood in terms of square footage, distance to work, and other amenities may nonetheless carry entirely different social and cultural messages as
a marker of status. Such signaling can be accurate or inaccurate, conscious
or unconscious, with complex cultural, gender, and other variations-but the
signal is an overlay onto actual material differences, and merits examination
as a distinct phenomenon.
The concept of property as a signal for social hierarchy has an intellectual history stretching back to some of our foundational thinking on
property and society And status signaling through property continues to
generate significant scholarly interest, sparking a rich contemporary literature in fields as diverse as psychology, sociology, anthropology, and
economics, as well as in specialized areas such as consumer and cultural
studies.9 This interdisciplinary scholarship, although grounded in somewhat
incongruent methodological commitments and theoretical assumptions, can
be read at the appropriate level of abstraction to yield several related insights. First, people communicate, in part, through consensually understood
symbols that gain their meaning through the way people interact around
those symbols. In this communication, property serves as an important locus
for symbolic meaning. In a related vein, people tend to compare themselves
to others as a way to understand themselves. Here again, property serves as
a particularly powerful source of information for that comparison. And this
comparative communication has clear and often negative consequences for
people's incentives and behavior around property.'0
These insights form a core framework for understanding status signaling
through property that has direct lessons for contemporary property theory,
offering both a more complete descriptive account and new grounds for
normative concern. People's propensity to use property to signal status and
the consequences of the resulting status races have long been seen as problematic in the popular imagination. Indeed, recognition of the moral anxiety
these dynamics produce is at least as old as the biblical injunction against
contemporary culture, status plays out across a variety of dimensions, although property remains an
important definitional force. See infra text accompanying notes 145-49.
8.

See infra Section H.A.

9.

See infra Section fl.B.

10. The drive to make interpersonal comparisons and the tendency to do so through property
are by no means universal or inherent in the sense that these aspects of personality and social interaction manifest themselves similarly (or even at all) in all individuals and all cultures. Moreover,
there are important gender, age, life-cycle and other variations to these dynamics, as will be explored below. See infra Section B.C.
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coveting your neighbor's possessions. But unpacking this concern significantly complicates the central discourses that shape contemporary property
theory, presenting potentially troubling counterpoints to what are often optimistic narratives in legal scholarship.
For visions of property that focus on incentives and resource allocation,
status signaling can distort the function that property rights are said to
serve.2 If people seek particular kinds of property and transact around property to satisfy what Richard McAdams calls relative preferences, 3 this may
over-incentivize the production of, or investment in, status-related resources.
These kinds of incentives perennially risk misallocation, both between the
choice to invest resources in property and the choice not to, and between
status-related versus non-status-related resources within the realm of property. Likewise, status races around property may obstruct bargaining about
property because relative status may be as important to the parties as any
underlying material benefits to be obtained by the exchange. And to the extent that property is invoked as a proxy for utility maximization-material
resources as a measure of welfare-the shifting preference satisfaction generated by comparisons through property may undermine welfare gains
associated with the accumulation of property. Simply put, there is increasing
evidence that beyond a basic level, more property does not necessarily yield
more well-being.
Next, status signaling also complicates any unalloyed veneration of
property's role in shaping and bolstering individual identity. 4 If a central
aspect of property is the competition and instability that flows from defining
one's sense of self by comparison to the possessions of others-a protean
measure at best-then property may have as much potential to warp personhood as to foster it. The need to match or conform to or even react against
the property of others can entangle this role for property in an ever-changing
and in many regards inauthentic feedback loop. Status signaling through
property may accordingly invest people's relationship with material things
with a potentially dysfunctional regard for other people's property.
Finally, the very interconnectedness reflected in social-relations conceptions of property may reinforce the institution's capacity to fuel competitive
consumption and undermine the communitarian benefits of property. 5 If
individuals are deeply conscious of the possessions of others, particularly
those in relatively similar material circumstances, the links that property
creates may serve as an engine for the communication of comparative positioning. Between communities, moreover, status signaling through property
can widen the gulfs material inequality generates. It may be, then, that the
11. Deuteronomy 5:21 (New Revised Standard Version) ("Neither shall you desire your
neighbor's house, or field, or male or female slave, or ox, or donkey, or anything that belongs to
your neighbor.").
12.

See infra Section II.A.

13.

Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1 (1992).

14.

See infra Section I.B.

15.

See infra Section II.C.
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more we are bound together through property, the more problematic relative
status becomes.
Just as legal scholars have left the phenomenon of status signaling
through property under-theorized, scholars in other disciplines have been
generally uninterested in the role law plays in that phenomenon. In reality,
there are a number of intersections between status signaling and the legal
institution's ground-level design. Property law at times gives state sanction
to, or provides the legal underpinnings for, the hierarchical tendencies at
work in status signaling. This is evident in intellectual property, land use,
real estate, and mortgage law, among other areas, where law variably reifies
status, gives it shape, or provides the conditions to facilitate status races.
Conversely, law at times makes status more fluid, creating anxiety but
also opportunity. Ambivalence about status signaling is evident in the structure of property doctrines such as rules on restraints against alienation,
limits on commodification, involuntary transfers through eminent domain
and adverse possession, and other areas where a change in legal relations
corresponds to a change in symbolic meaning. In each of these areas, as the
law loosens the grip of status, it also provides tools for new hierarchies to
emerge.
It is important to avoid the simplistic temptation to think that tinkering
with the structure of property can significantly change underlying individual
and cultural norms. 16 Nonetheless, recognizing the intricate intertwining of
doctrine and status signaling suggests that the design of property law may
be a way to temper some status races. Scholars have largely focused on tax
or penalty approaches-in essence reducing the fuel available for status
races. It might also be possible to regulate the signals that property sends,
but this would be a challenging role for the state. Property law, however,
might serve as a coordination mechanism, serving as a kind of firebreak for
status spirals. With appropriate caution, then, sensitivity to the statussignaling consequences of doctrinal design can provide a lens through
which to mold changes in property law to moderate what is normatively
troubling about the phenomenon.
In the end, it should hardly be surprising that status signaling is bound
up in why people seek property, how people allocate property, and what

people do with property once they have it. It may, however, be counterintuitive that this aspect of property is gaining in significance. Status signaling through property has traditionally been associated with the upper strata
of society-the top-hat and tuxedo-wearing dandies so often associated with
Thorstein
Veblen's
leisuretheclass.
However, our
contemporary
consumer culture
has spread
status-associated
expressive
qualitiesmass
of things

16. See Kenneth R. Minogue, The Concept of Property and Its Contemporary Significance,
in NoMos XXII: PROPERTY 3, 8 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) ("The simple
idea that it needs only a change in some external thing (such as the structure of property rights) to
transform the human condition is superstition lurking behind many treatments of the subject.").
17. THORSTEIN VEBLEN,
Univ. Press 2007) (1899).

THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS

(Martha Banta ed., Oxford
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to almost all levels of society." The mass nature of this competitive consumption draws on and at the same time feeds a deep well of status anxiety,
even (and perhaps especially) in times of economic crisis.' 9
Given that this central and increasingly important aspect of property has
gone unexamined in depth in the contemporary legal scholarship, 20 this Article makes three contributions to the literature. First, it adds to legal
scholarship a general framework for understanding property's statussignaling function. Second, it illustrates how contemporary property theory
remains incomplete and, in important respects, misguided in the absence of
an appreciation of this aspect of property. Third, the Article's exploration of
the role of law in this phenomenon adds a new perspective to the growing
interdisciplinary dialogue on property and status signaling.
Accordingly, Part I begins with a fuller outline of the three discourses in
property theory noted above: property as a source of incentives for production and as an allocative response to scarcity; property as a means of
developing individual autonomy and bolstering personhood; and property as
an institution that reflects and shapes social relations. Part II then surveys
how scholars historically and today have explored property's statussignaling function. Part III returns to property theory to demonstrate how
this interdisciplinary understanding complicates each of the three discourses. Finally, Part IV shifts from theory to doctrine, examining how
property law both bolsters and undermines property's status-signaling function. This recognition, ultimately, provides a normative frame for engaging
legal design to temper status races through property.

18.

JULIET

B.

SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN: UPSCALING, DOWNSHIFTING, AND THE

NEW CONSUMER 7-19 (1998).
19. For a sample of the slew of recent popular accounts of current anxieties around status,
see, for example, ALAIN DE BOTTON, STATUS ANXIETY 3-4 (2004), which describes status anxiety
as "[a] worry so pernicious as to be capable of ruining extended stretches of our lives, that we are in
danger of failing to conform to the ideals of success laid down by our society and that we may as a
result be stripped of dignity and respect; a worry that we are currently occupying too modest a rung
or are about to fall to a lower one," and NAN MOONEY, (NOT) KEEPING UP WITH OUR PARENTS:
THE DECLINE OF THE PROFESSIONAL MIDDLE CLASS (2008).

20. This is not to say that legal scholars have entirely ignored the dynamics that inform
status signaling through property. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 13 (discussing other-regarding
preferences in a variety of contexts, primarily to complicate law and economics understandings of
demand); Anita Bernstein, How Can a Product Be Liable?,45 DUKE L.J. 1, 27-31 (1995) (discussing the communicative meaning of objects in the context of refraining product-liability law). And
some property scholars have noted aspects of this phenomenon in particular contexts. See, e.g., Lee
Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1047, 1111-13 (2008) (exploring comparative-status considerations in home-ownership decisions). Moreover, in a tangential but not entirely
unrelated vein, Henry Smith and Thomas Merrill have done significant work on information costs
and property law. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000); Henry E. Smith, The
Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (2003). Merrill and
Smith's scholarship brings to the fore important aspects of how individuals transact around property
rights--and the legal system's reaction to the challenges posed by uncertainty. This Article, by contrast, focuses on a broader and more culturally embedded sense in which the objects of property law
and property law itself communicate, particularly about status.
HeinOnline -- 107 Mich. L. Rev. 764 2008-2009
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FUNCTIONAL DISCOURSES IN CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY THEORY

There are at least as many ways to approach property as there are academic disciplines or schools within those disciplines. Because signaling
status is ultimately a functional aspect of property, it is appropriate to begin
by organizing primary themes in property theory around pragmatic concems. This Part thus outlines three central discourses that frame
contemporary property theory in the legal literature, grouped according to
21
property's relation to allocation, identity, and social relations.
Each discourse reflects the primacy of certain instrumental aspects of
what property does and at the same time mirrors a corresponding set of
normative justifications for the arrangement of legal institutions concerning
property.22 These discourses are not mutually exclusive and this exploration
is necessarily reductionist, but understanding these common touch points
serves as a useful baseline for considering what else property might be do23
ing in our daily lives.
A. Propertyas a Response to Scarcity: Of Incentives and Allocation
If a perspective on property might be said to have achieved dominance
in contemporary theory, it is the basic utilitarian and economic perspective
that sees the institution
of property primarily as a response to problems
S24
posed by scarcity. This parses into two distinct, but related, underlying
concerns. The first concern is with creating the incentive for labor and investment. 2' As the argument has long been, without security of property,

21.
The discourses summarized in this Part represent something of a "mainstream" view of
property theory, and it is important to acknowledge that there have long been critical perspectives
that have directly and forcefully questioned the validity of each of these discourses. See, e.g.,
Macpherson, supra note 6, at 11-13. As discussed below, this Article's examination of the role of
property in status signaling seeks to complicate and deepen our understanding of the underpinnings
of these discourses but does not argue against the institution of property as such. See infra Part Il
and note 277.
22. Each of these discourses carries with it explicit or implicit assumptions about human
nature and motivation, the texture of social interaction, and, of course, the moral foundations of
rights associated with property. This Part briefly notes some of those assumptions, but reserves
direct engagement with those questions until Part III.
23. A fourth foundational discourse centers on the complex relationship between property
and political liberty. See generally RICHARD SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN
IDEA (Russell & Russell 1973) (1951). This discourse posits property as, alternatively, a creation of,
or a bulwark against, the state. Given this Part's functionalist approach, it is appropriate todefer this
strand of thought as an independent concern until the Article's discussion of the state's role in responding to status signaling in Part IV.
24. This vision of property has its roots in utilitarianism, although strictly utilitarian arguments could likewise be deployed to undermine any particular arrangement of property rights. ALAN
RYAN, PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY 92-95 (1984). This discourse generally finds expression

today in economics and in economically oriented legal scholarship.
25.

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.1 (7th ed. 2007) (arguing that

even where consumer demand exceeds the costs of production, "without property rights there is no
incentive to incur these costs because there is no reasonably assured reward for incurring them");
see also Dean Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, Property Law, in I HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
HeinOnline -- 107 Mich. L. Rev. 765 2008-2009
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primarily in the sense of the right of exclusion, individuals will not be secure in the knowledge that they can reap what they sow, falling into the
26
classic Hobbesian trap. Jeremy Bentham in the utilitarian tradition is perhaps most closely associated with the proposition that property is nothing
more (and,
S 27 importantly, should not be anything less) than the basis for expectation, but the incentive rationale is central to most contemporary
economic accounts of property. Indeed, two scholars recently went Bentham
one further, arguing that the overriding purpose of property as a legal institution is the creation and protection of the value that they see as inherent in
the stable ownership of assets.
Beyond providing security to incentivize the creation or development of
resources, the second primary concern this discourse highlights is how to
allocate those scarce resources and resolve the inevitable conflicts that scarcity generates. Harold Demsetz provides a standard starting point for
understanding how property fulfills these roles. To Demsetz, the emergence
of private property from the commons represents a response to changes in
the costs and benefits of exclusion. Where it is more costly to have a regime
of exclusivity than open or common access to a resource, property rights
will remain in the commons, but where there are gains to be made from internalizing costs and benefits, property rights will emerge.' 9 It is easy to
criticize Demsetz, as scholars have done, for eliding the mechanism through
which this transformation was to have occurred. 30 Demsetz's account, however, still stands for the proposition that private property will tend to align
the private costs and benefits of decisions about the use of resources with
the social consequences of those decisions and will also facilitate further
interactions around property by reducing the transaction costs of those interactions."'
183, 186 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (defining property rights as a "social
institution that creates incentives to efficiently use assets, and to maintain and invest in assets").
26. As Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have noted, William Blackstone emphasized the
link between security of property and incentives but was preceded in doing so by writers such as
Thomas Hobbes and David Hume. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Properly in Law and Economics?, Ill YALE L.J. 357, 361-62 & n.13 (2001); see also Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcON. REV. 347, 347 (1967) ("Property rights are an
instrument of society and derive their significance from the fact that they help a man form those
expectations which he can reasonably hold in his dealings with others.").
27. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111-12 (C.K. Ogden ed., Richard
Hildreth trans., Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1931) (1802) ("Property is nothing but a basis of expectation;
the expectation of deriving certain advantages from a thing which we are said to possess, in consequence of the relation in which we stand towards it.").
28. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property,90 CORNELL L. REV. 531
(2005).
29.

See Demsetz, supra note 26, at 349.

30. E.g., James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 325, 336 (1992); Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of
Private Property,80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 121 (2005).
31.
Another prominent allocation problem associated with property rights-a "reciprocal"
tragedy to that of the commons on which Demsetz focused-is the problem of fragmentation. Michael Heller has built a general theory of the anticommons, through which legal rules operate to
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Prescriptively, scholars focused on incentives and allocation tend to start

from a presumption of the advantages of relatively stronger property rights,
with infringements on rights of use, exclusion, and disposition to be justified
in the first instance as deviations from this norm." Where conflicts over resources arise, a corresponding preference is often found for legal rules that
facilitate bargaining-again, with the presumption that clear property

rights do just that.34 If transaction costs stand as a barrier to bargaining, the
preferred legal rule is one that lowers transaction costs. 35 If transaction costs

entirely preclude bargaining, efficiency suggests that remedies should approximate what a bargained-for resolution would have achieved.3 ' This focus
on remedial structure has given rise to a significant literature building on the

distinction between property rules and liability rules.37 Although this perspective allows that some resource conflicts may be better managed through
a governance strategy than an exclusion strategy" and a recognition of the

safety-valve function of liability rules in some circumstances, in the end
exclusion and its analogue in property-rule protection for entitlements predominate.39

This is a familiar account, but there is an aspect of this discourse that
bears direct relevance to understanding the consequences of status signaling

through property. One important, if frequently unstated, assumption underlying much of the diverse literature in this utilitarian and economic tradition
is that the demand being satisfied through the legal institution of property is
scale ownership to avoid the problem of underutilization of resources. MICHAEL HELLER, THE
GRIDLOCK ECONOMY (2008); see also Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in NoMos XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 6, 9 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1982) (positing the anticommons as a thought experiment).
32. This strong property rights baseline is often associated with Blackstone's famous description of property as sole and despotic dominion in total exclusion of the rights of others, but
Blackstone himself was hardly Blackstonian about property. David B. Schorr, How Blackstone
Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 103 (2009); see also Carol M. Rose,
Canons of Property Talk, or Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601 (1998).
33.

See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).

34. This might be because uncertainty about legal rules is a transaction cost or because there
are information-cost barriers to understanding a relatively certain set of legal rules. Accordingly, the
argument goes, efficiency prescribes simplicity and clarity in property rights. ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 93 (5th ed. 2008).
35.

Id. at 97.

36. Id. at 89, 104. Cooter and Ulen abstract this out to the argument that in the presence of
transaction-cost barriers to exchange, the law should assign property rights to the party that values
them most. Id. at 98.
37. The root of this theme in the scholarship is Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089 (1972), which has spawned a vast literature. E.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Uncertainty about PropertyRights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1289-95 (2008).
38. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategiesfor Delineating Property
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002).
39. Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1719 (2004). This
perspective on property also tends to favor making as much of the world as possible the object of
property. This universality has been critiqued by scholars concerned with the perils of commodification. See infra note 5 1.
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essentially self contained. This follows from the proposition in neoclassical
economics that the decision to consume is endogenous, and that production
follows the consumption function. 40 The corresponding assumption in the
disregard others 41in consuming, focusing
literature is that people generally
•
exclusively on their own internally generated needs.
Some economists and commentators in other fields have challenged this
traditional aspect of demand theory, highlighting the interdependence of
42
demand in many circumstances. As we shall see, changing this assumption
affects many aspects of the vision of property centered on incentives and
allocation through exchange.
B. Property and the Extended Self: Autonomy and
Personhoodin the Material World
A second major functional discourse shifts from problems of scarcity
and allocation to a different set of concerns centered around the link between property and individual development or identity. It is intuitive that
property-possessions of all sorts-form an important part of what William
James described as the extended self. James famously stated:
[I]t is clear that between what a man calls me and what he simply calls
mine the line is difficult to draw. We feel and act about certain things that
are ours very much as we feel and act about ourselves....
... In its widest possible sense, however, a man's Self is the sum total of
all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his
clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his
reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account.
All these things give him the same emotions. If they wax and prosper, he
feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down[]-not
necessarily
in the same degree in each thing, but in much the same way for
43

all.

Theorists, however, have developed a sophisticated vocabulary to understand the dimensions of this psychological and developmental role for
property.
40.

MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 62 (1953).

ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST
FOR STATUS 37 (1985) ("In setting up formal models of economic behavior, economists almost
41.

always assume at the outset that a person's sense of well-being, or utility, depends on the absolute
quantities of various goods he consumes, not on how those quantities compare with the amounts
consumed by others."); McAdams, supra note 13, at 7.
42.

See infra Section II.B.3.

43.

WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 291-92 (Cosimo, Inc. 2007) (1890).

Despite the anachronistically gendered tone of this passage, the insight that our sense of self is
directly linked to our material possessions is widely recognized. Indeed, as Floyd Rudmin has
noted, the link between property and identity has been a recurrent theme in the property literature
since at least as far back as Aristotle. Floyd Webster Rudmin, Ownership as Interpersonal Dominance: A History and Three Studies of the Social Psychology of Property 6-8 (Mar. 1988)
(unpublished doctoral thesis, Queen's University) (on file with author).
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A common starting point for considering property's role in individual
identity is Hegel. Particularly in his Philosophy of Right, Hegel articulated a
conception of human freedom grounded in the realization of the spirit or
Geist-the "Idea" or "Concept of freedom."" For Hegel, mastery over ob-

jects in the material world constituted an important step in the process
through which individuals become aware of this universal idea or concept in

themselves.4 5 Hegel thus linked ownership to moral development, envisioning the imposition of the will on the external world as a first step in an

individual's progression toward free will.4 By controlling property, an indistep to joining the
vidual gives that free will a stability that is a necessary
47
community of others with similarly mature wills.
Although this Hegelian conception of property's role can be notoriously

obscure (and its political commitments questionable), Hegel's emphasis on
the development of individual identity through control over the material
world is still a central way scholars think about the work of property.
Margaret Radin approached this same nexus from a different direction, starting with what she described as an intuitive claim about the necessity of

control over resources for people to achieve an individuated sense of self.41
The loss of some types of property, such as a wedding ring, Radin observed,
intuitively wrenches the emotions more than the loss of other possessions
less constitutive of the self.4 Radin took this basic distinction and derived a

justification structure for property rights that would privilege identityreinforcing aspects of "personal" property over "fungible" property. 0 Thus,
Radin argued, law might recognize the need to protect the stability around
identity connected to the aspect of personhood expressed through material
goods."

44. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 40-57 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1942) (1821). Beyond the more psychological aspects of Hegel's claims that appear in Philosophy
of Right, Hegel also discussed property in more sociological terms, focusing on tensions between
property owners and those without property in some of his earlier writing. RYAN, supra note 24, at
119.
45. To Hegel, "individuals need private property in order to sustain and develop the abilities
and self-conceptions definitive of their status as persons," and thus "they need to be able to 'embody' the freedom of their personalities in external objects so that their conceptions of themselves as
persons cease to be purely subjective and become concrete and recognizable to themselves and
others in a public and external world." JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 353
(1988).
46. For a discussion of Hegel's view of moral progression, see Peter G. Stillman, Property,
Freedom and Individuality in Hegel's and Marx's Political Thought, in Nomos XXII: PROPERTY,
supra note 16, at 130, 130-31.
supra note 45, at 378.

47.

WALDRON,

48.

Margaret Jane Radin, Propertyand Personhood, 34

49.

Id.at 959.

50.

Id. at 986-88.

STAN.

L. REV. 957, 957 (1982).

51. Id. at 1013-15. Focusing on the concern that certain aspects of the self should not be
made the object of property, or at least should not be made the basis for exchange, Radin and others
have offered a counterpart to the universalizing tendencies of utilitarian and economic perspectives
on property. E.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
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Hegel's philosophical perspective on the role of property in the development of free will and Radin's intuitive focus on the importance of
possessions to the self can both, on a basic level, be understood as
psychological claims.52 Psychologists and psychoanalytic theorists-not
only those in the Jamesian social-psychology tradition, but also descendents
of Freud and Jung-have themselves directly engaged with the connection
between property and the self.53 There is theoretical and empirical literature,

for example, that highlights the role of property in child development, exploring the role of possessions in early childhood.54 Similarly, studies have

examined how property can help individuals retain a sense of self in old
age.5" And scholars have developed an extensive literature on the psychological aspects of ownership, one theme of which is a view of property as
the symbolic and concretized manifestation of individual identity at all life
stages.5 6
Just as the basic economic approach to property generally assumes en-

dogenous demand, it is likewise significant that prevailing conceptions of
property and identity take the relationship between property and personhood

as largely inward looking. Hegel, for example, seems to take the imposition
of the will on the external world as an almost heroic quest of the individual

in the drive toward reason. While Hegel's conception requires that others
recognize the imposition of will, 7 it assumes that individuals will shape the
nature of ownership driven by their own interests in the world.

52. Although Radin herself did not focus in depth on the psychological aspects of her personhood theory, others have. E.g., Stephanie Stem, Residential Protectionism and the Legal
Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2009) (manuscript at 17-32, on file with
author); D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 277-82
(2006).
53. See generally Leonard Bloom, People and Property: A Psychoanalytic View, in To HAVE
POSSESSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON OWNERSHIP AND PROPERTY 427 (Floyd W. Rudmin ed., 1991); Jon
L. Pierce et al., The State of Psychological Ownership: Integrating and Extending a Century of
Research, 7 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 84 (2003). See also Jeremy A. Blumenthal, "To Be Human": A
Psychological Perspective on PropertyLaw, 83 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2009).
54. E.g., Lita Furby, The Origins and Early Development of Possessive Behavior, 2 POL.
PSYCHOL. 30, 35 (1980) ("Possessions become integrated with the child's developing concept of self
because they offer a very high degree of contingent control, almost as great as the control one experiences over one's body."). As Rudmin notes, the link between childhood development and
possessions can be traced to James. Rudmin, supra note 43, at 22. See generally id. at 40-43 (reviewing studies of possessive behavior and related topics in child development).
55.

E.g., HELGA DITTMAR, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MATERIAL POSSESSIONS 115-16

(1992).
56. E.g., CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & ROCHBERG-HALTON, supra note 7. This literature highlights
the role of possessions in reinforcing memory (as with favorite pictures), defining aspects of self (as
with favorite music), and also shaping our sense of self in more abstract terms (as with possessions
used to bolster confidence and stave off negative emotions). Much has been written about consumption as expressive of identity more generally. E.g., SCHOR, supra note 18, at 45-63.
57.

WALDRON,

supra note 45, at 375-77.
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Likewise, for Radin, the personhood that can become tied up in property
seems largely self-directed." One envisions from Radin an individual going
out into the world and binding her sense of self to various objects. Although
some of the meaning attached to any particular object might reflect relationships (as with a wedding ring), the process of meaning formation remains
largely an autonomous construction of the self. The relationship between
property and the self thus presumes a process of individuation where what is
significant about the personal-property relationship is internal-the memories attached to an object, what a place says about "who I am," how a
possession is used to advance personal well-being.
Personhood theories, in short, tend to assume that if property helps define identity, it does so largely as a self-contained exercise. As with the selfregarding consumption that is a predicate to utilitarian and economic perspectives, changing the assumption about how self-contained the exercise of
embodying identity through property is can change our understanding of
this discourse in property.
C. Property, Community, and Social Relations

A final important discourse around property shifts from the scarcity of
resources and the nature of identity as central organizing concerns and instead looks to property as a construct-and creator--of social relations.5 9
This enduring communitarian perspective has had many iterations, but
throughout has presented a functional vision of property as the realm of
deeply embedded relationships and community, with a normative focus on
the obligations that arise from these interconnections.6
The legal realists, particularly Felix Cohen, Morris Cohen, and Robert
Hale, laid the groundwork for our modern understanding of the role of social relations in property. 6' To the realists, property rights, far from natural or
abstract propositions, were understood to grow out of particular social conditions, reflecting state decisions about the distribution of entitlements.
These distributional choices inherently limit the freedom of those against
whom property rights-particularly, but not only, exclusionary rights-are
58. Cf. Stern, supra note 52 (manuscript at 22) (arguing that, although Radin acknowledged
the expressive aspects of property, her focus was primarily on property's "self-constructive" function).
59.

See generally Stephen R. Munzer, Property as Social Relations, in NEW

LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY

ESSAYS IN THE

36 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).

60. Property as social relations shares a close conceptual affinity with ecological perspectives on property, which likewise emphasize the embedded and interconnected nature of property.
E.g., Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 26
HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 281 (2002); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81
YALE L.J. 149, 152 (1971) ("Particular parcels are tied to one another in complex ways, and property is more accurately described as being inextricably part of a network of relationships that is
neither limited to, nor usefully defined by, the property boundaries with which the legal system is
accustomed to dealing.").
61. Indeed, the phrase "property as social relations" can be traced to Felix Cohen. Munzer,
supra note 59, at 38 (noting that the phrase was coined in Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private
Property,9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 361 (1954)).
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asserted, and facilitate a kind of state-backed private coercion involved in
62
market relations. Property, in this view, is a social construct and it is as
natural to talk about the right to exclude as it is to posit a right "not to be
excluded" as an incident of property.63
For some social-relations theorists, the choice to privilege one party over
another in any property relationship carries with it the potential instead to
foster mutual obligation. 4 Thus, civic republican perspectives emphasize
that with property comes responsibility to society and obligations to the
community. 5 And the relational aspects of property are also seen to give rise
not just to general common duties, but to specific interpersonal obligations. 6
Property and expectation, in this view, can mediate individual relations, with
property rights emerging as reflections of the relationships that property
67
fosters. Property may create community boundaries as68much as it creates
individual boundaries against the state or the community.
A final strain of social-relations thinking highlights the essentially social
character of individuals as a descriptive and normative frame. Some scholars
have argued that this inherent social nature yields a view of property as nec69
essary to foster the flourishing associated with that social character. Others
look to Aristotelian and Thomistic conceptions of the intrinsic
nature of in. 70
dividuals as social beings to reach a similar conclusion. Property is thus
seen to serve "as a means of joining individuals to each other in community," reflecting a deep "human need for stable companionship and
sociability."'"
Collectively, social-relations theories often gain traction through opposition to Lockean-liberal conceptions of the absoluteness of property. 72
62.
POL. Sci.

See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW (1952).

Q. 470 (1923). See generally

63.

Macpherson, supra note 6, at 4.

64.

Gregory Alexander has labeled this perspective the "proprietarian" vision of property.

See generally GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970 (1997).

65.

See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norn in American Property Law, 94

CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming May 2009).
66.
See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611
(1988) [hereinafter Singer, Reliance Interest]. See generally JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 209-13 (2000) [hereinafter SINGER, ENTITLEMENT].

67.

Singer, Reliance Interest, supra note 66.

68.
Davina Cooper, Opening Up Ownership: Community Belonging, Belongings, and the
Productive Life of Property, 32 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 625, 629-30 (2007) (arguing that the "most
important" element of the work of property is "belonging" as defining social relations within a
larger group).
69.
Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162
(1990); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, I REV. CONST. STUD. 1 (1993).
70.
Eduardo M. Pefialver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889 (2005); see also Gregory Alexander & Eduardo Pefialver, Properties of Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L.

127 (2009).
71.

Pefialver, supra note 70, at 1894.

72.

See SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 66, at 207-08.
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Property, to social-relations theorists, is less about a zone of freedom from
state and community control, and more about the ties that bind neighbors,
employers and employees, landlords and tenants, and similar relationships
mediated through the material world. This expansive view of property rights
challenges the notion that property begins as a core of fairly stable rights of
use, exclusion, and disposition against which interventions from the state
should be understood as derogations. Rather, social-relations theorists understand that the very definition of property carries with it inherent
limitations and mutual obligations.
This is an important corrective to overly exclusionary visions of property. What is significant at this juncture, however, is less what property and
social-relations theories say about the nature of coercion and autonomy and
more what this approach presents as a functional vision of how property
operates-property as flowing from, and in turn shaping, deeply embedded,
context-specific relationships. And just as the link between property and
identity is functionally a psychological claim, property and social relations
not surprisingly brings to legal scholarship something of a sociological perspective. Accordingly, social-relations theorists are particularly sensitive to
concerns about power imbalances embodied in the structure of property law,
the distributional consequences of apparently neutral entitlements, and the
responsibilities that ownership can entail for collective well-being.73
In marked distinction to the essentially inward-looking perspectives that
undergird the first two discourses examined in this Part, the vision of property as social relations is deeply centered on the interconnectedness of
property. Despite this awareness, however, scholars in this tradition have not
paid much attention, if any at all, to the status-signaling aspects of this interconnectivity. This is as much a gap in the social-relations discourse as
interconnection is in the exclusionary visions of property economists offer
and the internal perspective identity theorists favor.
In sum, from a functional perspective, property in contemporary theory
is variably understood as a response to scarcity, as a foundation for individual identity, and as both the glue for and residue of social relations. The role
that property plays in signaling status, we shall see, complicates each of
these visions in fundamental ways, and the next Part lays the foundation for
unpacking the nature of that role.

II. THEORIES

OF PROPERTY AND STATUS SIGNALING

Anyone watching the way children in a sandbox instantly define who is
important by who happens to have a shovel or pail while the most desirable
shovel or pail is always the one being held by another child can understand
how property can shape, signal, and reinforce status hierarchies as well as
how those hierarchies shape what makes property significant. These dynamics have long been fodder for social thinkers who have historically grappled
with the nature of property, particularly as modem conceptions of markets
73.

See supratext accompanying notes 61-68.
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and individual consumers emerged. Building on these historical perspectives, contemporary scholars in an array of disciplines, including sociology,
social psychology, anthropology, economics, and others, have continued to
develop a complex, robust vocabulary and empirical grounding to explain
and bolster our understanding of this aspect of property.
This Part synthesizes this historical and more recent scholarship to offer
a framework for understanding property's role in signaling comparative
status. The task here is not to provide a definitive account of status signaling, but rather to limn the general outlines of how, why, and to what effect
people use property to communicate their relative position.74
A. ComparativeStatus in the IntellectualHistory of Property

The intellectual history of property evinces a long tradition of 15thinkers
recognizing a comparative dynamic around material possessions. Variations on the basic ideas, then, that people compare themselves with others
on the basis of their property, that that comparison can be a fundamental
motivation, and that this process of comparison can be troubling for what it
does to the signaler and the recipient recur repeatedly.
Early modem thinking about property coincided with a cultural moment

that paired the end of feudalism with the first stirrings of consumer culture. 76

For centuries, particularly in England, property in the sense of land tenures
reflected a clear hierarchy of fixed status, with a chain reaching from the
king down through various mense lords to the lowest villeins. 77 To have
property was to occupy a place in that chain, owing duties to superiors and
subordinates, with a vast legal and political structure reinforcing the meaning and content of these fixed hierarchies.
As land became increasingly alienable, feudalism gradually gave way to
a legal system in which the link between property and status became correspondingly attenuated. As merchants were beginning to replace the landed
gentry as the center of power, Western thought was turning away from the
predominance of fixed categories, such as kin groups and clans, for
74. There is always a risk in this kind of interdisciplinary survey of cherry picking relevant
insights while minimizing the theoretical richness and often clashing incompatibilities inherent in
the exercise. It is important to acknowledge this risk-although this is not often enough done-and
be clear that no claim is made here for exhausting the literature or reconciling the irreconcilable.
Nonetheless, it would be just as inappropriate to ignore bodies of work that present stable, coherent
themes that bear direct relevance, where they exist.
75. Discussions of the connection between property and status signaling go back as far as
classical thought. See, e.g., Rudmin, supra note 43, at 7, 49 (arguing that when Aristotle wrote, in
Ethics, that "the magnificent man spends not on himself but on public objects," he was acknowledging property's ability to signal status and cautioning against reinforcing "social distinction through
consumption").
76.

Cf

GRANT MCCRACKEN, CULTURE

AND CONSUMPTION:

NEW APPROACHES TO THE

SYMBOLIC CHARACTER OF CONSUMER GOODS AND ACTIVITIES 10-22 (1988) (discussing the signifi-

cant changes in patterns of consumption in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries).
77. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 175-77 (6th ed. 2006); see also David Lieberman,
Property Commerce, and the Common Law, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 144
(John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1995).
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individual identity and beginning
to focus on rationality and a science of
S78
autonomous human behavior. The landed gentry required increasing
amounts of wage labor to work the land, and novel demands sparked a
movement toward the democratization of rights.7 9 Sectors of society rele-

gated to low status under premodern conditions began, if tentatively at first,
to assert freedom to develop their personalities in their own way.s° Reflecting this shift, a number of Enlightenment and later thinkers grappled with
the signaling aspects of property and their effects on incentives and identity,
recognizing the fluidity of status and the increasing role of wealth and possessions in marking what had previously been clear, relatively singular

hierarchical structures.8'
Early in the Enlightenment, for example, David Hume offered a glimpse

of how the new commercial and social reality was to be understood. Hume
wrote extensively about the determinants and consequences of pride, citing

personal connection with property as a primary source of that pride and also
a way people evaluate others." Hume emphasized that people are motivated

by what they think of their own state largely in comparison with others, with
"objects" and "wealth" critical determinants of this comparison."
Although property scholars focus on what John Locke said about prop-

erty's origins and justification, like Hume, Locke speculated on the link
between the symbolism of property and status. Indeed, Locke was perhaps
the earliest thinker to note that for some things, high prices contributed to,

rather than detracted from, their demand. 84 Prefiguring modem notions of
conspicuous consumption, Locke tried to explain this apparent puzzle by

78.

CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 11-

12 (1989).
79.
PROPERTY,

80.

Margaret R. Somers, The "Misteries" of Property, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF

supra note 77, at 62, 63.
TAYLOR, supra note 78, at 11-13.

81. E.g., WOODRUFF D. SMITH, CONSUMPTION AND THE MAKING OF RESPECTABILITY, 16001800, at 25-26 (2002). Smith documents a consumer revolution that began in the seventeenth century and burgeoned in the eighteenth century, characterized by changes in the quantity and types of
consumer goods available. Id. at 6. As a result of changing culture and new patterns of trade, Europeans began consuming in new ways. Id. at 6-8. For Smith, newfound buying power of laborers was
connected to civil rights-and autonomy-which in turn provided motives to consume in order to
further class and status distinctions and to emulate peers and superiors. Id. at 8.
82. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 309 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1888) (1739) ("[T]he relation, which is esteem'd the closest, and which of all others
produces most commonly the passion of pride, is that of property.").
83. Id. at 375 ("'Tis evident we must receive a greater or less satisfaction or uneasiness from
reflecting on our own condition and circumstances, in proportion as they appear more or less fortunate or unhappy, in proportion to the degrees of riches, and power, and merit, and reputation, which
we think ourselves possest of. Now as we seldom judge of objects from their intrinsic value, but
form our notions of them from a comparison with other objects; it follows, that according as we
observe a greater or less share of happiness or misery in others, we must make an estimate of our
own, and feel a consequent pain or pleasure.").
84.

Rudmin, supra note 43, at 49.
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pointing to ostentatious display of wealth as the basis for the desirability of
luxury goods.85
In offering a counterpoint to Locke's story of the emergence of property
from the state of nature, another Enlightenment figure, Rousseau, in his
Discourse on Inequality associated the development of property less with
labor removing the fruits of the earth from the commons, and more with the
spiraling effects of artificial desire. As noted at the outset, to Rousseau
property invoked "the burning passion to increase one's relative fortune less
out of real need than to make oneself superior to others."8" To Rousseau,
87
then, the comparative urge was at the very heart of what property meant.
Hume's close friend Adam Smith started with a sense of the role of
property similar to that of Hume and Rousseau, but was more sanguine
about what this comparative urge would produce. Indeed, it is fair to say that
Smith identified the desire for comparative status as the engine of individual
accumulation and the foundation of modern capitalism. Thus, in his Theory
of Moral Sentiments, Smith wrote:
It is because mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with our
joy than with our sorrow, that we make parade of our riches, and conceal
our poverty. Nothing is so mortifying as to be obliged to expose our distress to the view of the public, and to feel, that though our situation is open
to the eyes of all mankind, no mortal conceives for us the half of what we
suffer. Nay, it is chiefly from this regard to the sentiments of mankind, that
we pursue riches and avoid poverty.88
Smith also recognized that status through material possessions tends to
reflect an ever-shifting baseline of necessity and desire. As Smith put it,
"necessaries [are] not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it
indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without."'8 9
In the middle of the nineteenth century as the Industrial Revolution was
reaching its early apex in Europe, both Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill
would hearken back to Rousseau's concern with the pernicious effects of
status signaling in property. "When once the means of living have been obtained," Mill wrote, "the far greater part of the remaining labour and effort
which takes place on the earth, has for its object to acquire the respect or the
85.

Id.

86.

ROUSSEAU,

supra note 1,at 66.

87. Rousseau's story of the corrupting influence of property in destroying what he considered to have been an idyllic state of nature may be as implausible (and ahistorical) as the story on
which Locke based his labor theory, but it can be seen as a marker that captures a historically important perspective on property nonetheless. Thomas Hobbes had a similar view of the role of relative
status in property, arguing that the "passion for power included the desire for riches, and this passion
was insatiable since men would always compare themselves with others and strive for superiority."
Rudmin, supra note 43, at 15 (discussing Hobbes).
88. ADAM
1875) (1759).

SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS

70 (London, George Bell & Sons

89. 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES
869-70 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1776).
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favourable regard of mankind ....
"90 Mill likewise observed that "a great
portion of the expenses of the higher and middle classes in most countries
9
...[is incurred] from regard to opinion." ' All this, to Mill, led to wasteful
expenditure on luxuries, which he concluded should be taxed. 92
To Marx, private property-or, more specifically, "bourgeois" private
property-was the basis for and the product of the reification of social
93
power, defining what separated the classes. Marx was sensitive to comparative signaling through property, noting that a "house may be large or
small; as long as the neighboring houses are likewise small, it satisfies all
social requirements for a residence. But let there arise next to the little house
a palace, and the little house shrinks to a boat."94 Marx, of course, went far
beyond Millian tinkering, arguing that private property should be abolished. 95
Although this brief review can only hint at the breadth of early property
thinkers' engagement with status signaling,96 one final social observer bears
mention for his work setting much of the terms of our contemporary discourse. In 1899, at the height of the Gilded Age, Thorstein Veblen published
his Theory of the Leisure Class.97 Tilting against conventional economic
views of private property (then and now), Veblen challenged the proposition
that the "economically legitimate end of acquisition" is consumption, both
to serve "the consumer's physical wants" and, indirectly, his "spiritual, aesthetic, intellectual" and other "so-called higher wants."98 Rather, Veblen
argued, incentives for striving and producing come not from the needs

90.

JOHN STUART MILL, THREE ESSAYS ON RELIGION 87 (photo. reprint 1962) (1874).

91.

JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 869 (W.J. Ashley ed., Long-

mans, Green, and Co. 1909) (1848).

92.

Id.

KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS,
(Friedrich Engels ed., Int'l Publ'rs 1933) (1848).

93.

MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY 24-25

94.
McAdams, supra note 13, at I I n.30 (quoting KARL MARX, WAGE-LABOUR AND CAPITAL 33 (Int'l Publ'r 1976) (1849)).
95.

MARX & ENGELS, supra note 93, at 23-25.

96.

See generally McAdams, supra note 13, at 11-12 & n.30 (also citing, for example, JOHN
RAE, THE NEW PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1834), reprintedin SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF
CAPITAL (Charles W. Mixter ed., 1905) for identifying social waste associated with "vanity," and
Alfred Marshall, the progenitor of modem demand theory, who examined the "power and prevalence of the human desire for 'distinction' "); Rudmin, supra note 43, at 54 (noting Herbert
Spencer's discussion of the role of property as a "ceremonial institution" through which trophy
possessions "give to their owner some influence over those around him" (citing 2 HERBERT
SPENCER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY

36 (1879))).

97. VEBLEN, supra note 17. Veblen's theories have generated a vast literature, some of which
is explored below. Veblen has been attacked on several fronts-for misunderstanding the nature of
status consumption, underestimating individual agency in consumption decisions, and oversimplifying status relations, among others. See Juliet B. Schor, In Defense of Consumer Critique:
Revisiting the Consumption Debatesof the Twentieth Century, 611 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc.
Sci. 16, 19-21 (2007). Veblen's insights into the status-related nature of property, howeve:r, remain
deeply influential.
98.

VEBLEN, supra note 17, at 22.

HeinOnline -- 107 Mich. L. Rev. 777 2008-2009

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 107:757

associated with consumption, but instead from what he called "emulation." 99
Thus the drive to create "invidious distinction ' ° that is expressed through
property, Veblen concluded, has always predominated over any subsistencerelated necessity.'0 '
From the argument that invidious distinction lies at the heart of property,
Veblen then turned to the mechanisms through which that distinction is established and maintained. In modern industrial society, wealth becomes a
proxy for esteem, which
is then internalized by the holders of wealth as an
1102
element of self-respect. Since comparisons are made to "others with
whom" a person "is accustomed to class himself," as soon as a given comparative status is achieved the status ceases to grant the satisfaction of
superiority, generating a cycle of comparison.' Central to this cycle is
''conspicuous consumption,'" the visible ritual of possessing and using those
objects that signify relatively higher status (particularly the consumption of
unnecessary goods and services),'0 and Veblen argued that the cycle is evident not just among the so-called "leisure class," but as an aspect of
consumption and the standard of living at every level of society.' 5
From a surprisingly long line of early modern thinkers, then, a picture of
property emerges that is unfamiliar in the contemporary legal literature. This
vision situates property as an institution through which a constant process of
competition and status anxiety plays out, with the accumulation and display
of property serving as a driving incentive for economic activity, and the risk
of status loss requiring constant response. Some commentators saw this as
deeply disturbing; others, inevitable and perhaps even essential. This vision
may not be in the mainstream of legal property thought today, but in a number of other fields, it continues to generate a complex, active literature.
B. Contemporary Perspectives on Status Signaling,
Hierarchy,and Property

Moving to contemporary scholarship, a number of related fields offer insights that give theoretical depth and empirical support to the long-standing
99. Id. ("The motive that lies at the root of ownership is emulation; and the same motive of
emulation continues active in the further development of the institution to which it has given rise
and in the development of all those features of the social structure which this institution of ownership touches.").
100.

Id.

101. Id. at 23 ("Ownership began and grew into a human institution on grounds unrelated to
the subsistence minimum. The dominant incentive was from the outset the invidious distinction
attaching to wealth, and, save temporarily and by exception, no other motive has usurped the primacy at any later stage of the development.").
102.

Id. at25.

103.

Id.

104.

Id. at 49-72.

105. Id. at 58-59. Veblen noted two related processes: invidious comparison, in which consumption is used to mark higher status, and "pecuniary emulation," in which consumption is used to
signal upward mobility. Id. at 25-26.
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intuition that property plays an important role in signaling status. The general understanding that emerges from this literature has three central
components. First, as sociologists have emphasized, people understand their
world at least in part through interaction with others, with property playing
a particularly important role in this communicative process. Second, social
psychologists have done extensive work on the process through which people compare themselves to others, with property again playing an important
role in that comparison. Finally, economists have explored the often negative effects of the status races that develop around the resulting interpersonal
comparisons through property. This Section explores each of these related
lines of inquiry in turn.' 0 6
1. Propertyas Communication

To start to unpack the way property signals status, it is necessary to have
an account of how individuals relate to, and through, property on a symbolic
level. This, intheturn,
requires
an explanation .of how07and what property-in
suff
enseof
f teth
the sense of the stuff of the world-communicates. Many disciplines, particularly anthropology' °s and semiotics,'0 9 have explored the role of various
sorts of possessions in communication, but certain strains of sociology and
social psychology offer particularly rich vocabularies to understand this
phenomenon.
Emile Durkheim, in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, argued that

possessions are among the many symbols given meaning through social
rituals.1 Durkheim's exploration of the sociology of symbols prefigured the
modem field of symbolic interactionism, which has developed a fuller vocabulary through which to understand how individuals mediate social
meaning through external objects. 1' This perspective starts with the
106. The literature offers a number of explanations for what generates the comparative drive
in general. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 41, at 21-26; Oliver Goodenough, Values, Mechanism Design, and Fairness, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 13
(Paul J. Zak ed., 2007); BELL HOOKS, WHERE WE STAND: CLASS MATTERS (2000). For present purposes, it is sufficient to recognize the existence of the comparative drive in contemporary American
culture-with some emphasis on the psychological and social psychological aspects of the phenomenon.
107.
See Rudmin, supra note 43, at 3 ("Property is a form of symbolic expression. A person's
material possessions communicate personal and social information, dependent on cultural norms of
interpretation."); see also Rose, supra note 4, at 5 (noting that "the proper study of property is communication, rhetoric, language").

108. See DOUGLAS & ISHERWOOD, supra note 5, at 59 ("It is standard ethnographic practice to
assume that all material possessions carry social meanings and to concentrate a main part of cultural
analysis upon their use as communicators.").
109. See generally ROLAND BARTHES, ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY (Annette Layers & Colin
Smith trans., Hill and Wang 1967) (1964); Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 489, 521-24 (2006).
110. Rudmin, supra note 43, at 53 (discussing EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS
OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE (Joseph Ward Swain trans., George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1915) (1912)).
111.
SYMBOLIC

Landmark works in the symbolic interactionist literature include HERBERT BLUMER,
INTERACTIONISM:

PERSPECTIVE

AND

METHOD

(1969);

ERVING
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seemingly basic proposition that it is through processing interactions with
external objects and other people that individuals develop their sense of self
and their understanding of the world. As described by Herbert Blumer, a
disciple of the sociologist and social psychologist George Herbert Mead,
people "act
' 2toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have
for them." "
This meaning is neither fixed and inherent on the one hand, nor entirely
subjective on the other, but rather derives from social interactions and an
interpretative process that grows out of those interactions. Accordingly, central to this view is an understanding of individual behavior that reflects a
middle line between external forces such as social position and group affiliation and internal forces such as the subconscious. Mead, Blumer, and
others in this tradition concluded that how people act in the world flows
from "what lies in between, a reflective and socially derived interpretation
of the internal and external stimuli that are present.""' 3
Charles Horton Cooley, another important source for modern interactionism, argued that our sense of self results in part from how we conceive
of our perceptions in the eyes of others, what Cooley famously called the
"looking-glass" self."l4 To Cooley, our identities reflect how the messages
we send about ourselves are reflected back in the reaction of others, specifically, "the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the
imagination of his judgment of that appearance, and some sort of selffeeling, such as pride or mortification."'' The modem descendants of Mead
and Cooley have emphasized that our sense of self is formed in no small
measure by the process of understanding deeply embedded social interactions.' 6
The role of material objects as sites for developing this meaning has
been a central aspect of symbolic interactionist theory since the outset.'"
When Blumer referred to "things," he had in mind much more than just
property, yet a line of symbolic interactionists have explored the particular
PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959); and BERNARD N. MELTZER ET AL., SYMBOLIC
INTERACTIONISM: GENESIS, VARIETIES AND CRITICISM (1975). Symbolic interactionism has its roots

in the sociological writings of Max Weber and the philosophy of George Herbert Mead, with their
mutual emphasis on both the social process and the subjective meaning of human behavior. As discussed below, similar roots underpin the social psychological literature on social comparison. See
infra Section II.B.2.
112. BLUMER, supra note 11l,
at 2. As Blumer wrote, meaning is interactive-is a social
product-in that the "meaning of a thing for a person grows out of the ways in which other persons
act toward the person with regard to the thing." Id. at 4.
113.

MELTZER

ET AL.,

supra note 111, at 2.

114. CHARLES HORTON
action Books 1983) (1902).
115.

Id. at 184.

116.

See

DITTMAR,

COOLEY, HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

168-2 10 (Trans-

supra note 55, at 65-94.

117. See BLUMER, supra note 11,at 10-11 (discussing the nature of objects-physical and
abstract-that form the basis for symbolic interaction); E. Doyle McCarthy, Toward a Sociology of
the Physical World: George Herbert Mead on Physical Objects, 5 STUD. SYMBOLIC INTERACTION
105 (1984).
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nature of symbolic communication through the more conventional sense of
"things." s As Grant McCracken has argued, tangible property is "an
unusually cunning and oblique device for the representation of fundamental
cultural truths."'"19
Property serves this role in establishing meaning by transmitting significant amounts of social and cultural information that would be difficult to
communicate directly.' 20 In consumer studies, for example, empirical work
has identified the signals that a variety of consumer products send. 12 ' A
number of scholars have explored the communicative-and particularly
homes, 124 ofstatus-communicative-aspects of clothing, 122 cosmetics,
26
fices,"' and a variety of other common types of property.1 Empirical work,
moreover, has demonstrated the variety of interconnected messages that
possessions signal. One comparative international study, for example, suggested that there are connections between perceptions of wealth and
(a direct corperceptions of the amount of control a person is able to assert
2

relation) or how warm a person is (an inverse correlation). 1
A consistent theme in this literature is the ability of objects and sets of
objects to transmit information that is clearly understood by recipients, underscoring the symbolic-interactionist insight that consensus about social
meaning has wide salience.12 And if people form their identity through

Cf Russell W. Belk, Assessing the Effects of Visible Consumption on Impression Forma118.
tion, 5 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 39, 39 (1978) ("The belief that a person's possession and
expenditures reveal something about the person may be one of the strongest cultural universals
affecting consumer behavior. In virtually all cultures, visible products and services are the bases for
inferences about the status, personality, and disposition of the owner or consumer of these goods.").
119.
MCCRACKEN, supra note 76, at 68; see also Andrew N. Christopher et al., Materialism
and self-presentationalstyles, 38 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 137 (2005).
Cf.DITTMAR, supra note 55, at 65 (citing survey evidence for the proposition that "the
120.
symbolic aspects of possessions are more important than their practical functions").
A number of consumer scholars have explored the Jamesian link between possessions
121.
and the "extended self' in the consumer culture context. E.g., Aaron C. Ahuvia, Beyond the Extended Self. Loved Objects and Consumers' Identity Narratives, 32 J. CONSUMER RES. 171 (2005);
Eric J. Arnould & Craig J. Thompson, Reflections, Consumer Culture Theory (CCT): Twenty Years
of Research, 31 J. CONSUMER RES.868 (2005); Russell W. Belk, Possessions and the Extended Self,
15 J. CONSUMER RES. 139 (1988); Hope Jensen Schau, Consumer Imagination, Identity and Selfexpression, 27 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 50 (2000); Michael R. Solomon, The Role of Productsas
Social Stimuli: A Symbolic Interactionism Perspective, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 319 (1983).
E.g., Gregory P. Stone, Appearance and the Self, in HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND SOCIAL
122.
PROCESSES: AN INTERACTIONIST APPROACH 86 (Arnold M. Rose ed., 1962).
123.

E.g., Angela Chao & Juliet B. Schor, Empirical tests of status consumption: Evidence
ECON. PSYCHOL. 107 (1998).

from women's cosmetics, 19 J.

E.g., Edward K. Sadalla et al., Identity Symbolism in Housing, 19 ENV'T & BEHAV. 569,
124.
572-73, 583-86 (1987).
E.g., Samuel D. Gosling et al., A Room With a Cue: Personality Judgments Based on
125.
Offices and Bedrooms, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 379 (2002).
126.
E.g., Americus Reed 11,Activating the Self-Importance of Consumer Selves: Exploring
Identity Salience Effects on Judgments, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 286, 293 (2004).
127.
Helga Dittmar et al., Finefeathers make fine birds: a comparative study of the impact of
material wealth on perceived identities in Englandand Italy, 4 Soc. BEHAV. 195 (1989).
128.

See DITTMAR, supra note 55, at 10.
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material possessions, the converse is also true: people form understandings
of others' identities at least in part in the same way.129
A related insight, one particularly important for considering the role of
law in status signaling through property, is that symbolic interaction through
material objects can be manipulated. 3 ° Erving Goffman identified a myriad
of ways that people engage in what he called "impression management.''
A central aspect of this process involves deliberate manipulation of the messages that possessions and other outward aspects of the self send. Using a
theatrical metaphor to explore the role of performance in everyday life,
Goffman argued that individuals manage their "stage" and the "props" they
use, as well as the messages communicated to the "audience" of larger society.'32 These messages require consensus about meaning, but, as Goffman
suggested, that consensus is not static, can be consciously directed, and often is reached through possessions and place.'33
2. Development of Self by Reference to Others

If symbolic interactionism provides a vocabulary to help understand
how individuals communicate through material objects, the next step is understanding what, exactly, is communicated and how such information is
received. Social psychologists have built upon a similar sensitivity to the
socially constructed nature of identity and the importance of material possessions to the formation of identity through interpersonal comparisons. 3 4 In
1954, Leon Festinger launched the field of social-comparison theory with
his seminal Theory of Social Comparison Processes.11 In the article,
their own
Festinger began with the proposition that individualst• evaluate
136
opinions and abilities to improve their chances of survival. Wherever possible, Festinger argued, individuals look to relatively concrete indicators to
evaluate these aspects of self.'37 However, objective standards are inherently
limited in many situations, and are entirely unavailable for many important
129.

See id. at 88-92.

130. Cf Grant McCracken, Culture and Consumption: A Theoretical Account of the Structure
and Movement of the Cultural Meaning of Consumer Goods, 13 J. CONSUMER RES. 71 (1986).
McCracken explores the "alienable, moveable, manipulable quality" of the meaning of consumer
goods. Id. at 81.
supra note 111, at 208.

131.

GOFFMAN,

132.

Id. at 22-30, 51-58.

133. Cf id. at 228-55 (discussing the conscious process of staging to express the self and the
social dialectic in which that presentation occurs).
134.
SON

AND

For some recent important works in this literature, see, for example, SOCIAL COMPARIGuimond ed., 2006), and SOCIAL COMPARISON:
SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (Serge

CONTEMPORARY

135.

THEORY AND RESEARCH (Jerry Suls & Thomas Ashby Wills eds., 1991).

Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, 7 HuM.

REL.

117 (1954).

136. Id. at 118; see also Jerry M. Suls, Social Comparison Theory and Research: An Overview from 1954, in SOCIAL COMPARISON PROCESSES 1, 3 (Jerry M. Suls & Richard L. Miller eds.,
1977).
137.

Festinger, supra note 135, at 118-19.
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personal traits, such as political opinions and social status. 3 8 Thus, individu-

als look to others to assess their own abilities, yielding a constant process of
social comparison to evaluate abilities and opinions in most circumstances. 9 In short, people seek to understand themselves and their place in
the world at least in part by comparing themselves to others.

In the more than half-century since Festinger's article, scholars have
elaborated in great depth on the underpinnings of this theory. For example,
it is widely understood that people often choose a comparator they perceive
as salient-particularly relevant and similarly situated.' 4° Moreover, some
people choose to compare themselves to those whom they perceive to have
higher status on any given criterion, which has been labeled "upward comparison."1 4 1 Conversely, particularly when self-esteem is threatened,

individuals may choose instead to make a "downward comparison," comparing themselves with someone they perceive as inferior on a given
characteristic.1 42 This subsequent scholarship adds the psychology of selfenhancement to Festinger's focus on self-evaluation. 143 Social comparison
thus does not necessarily translate into social conformity, and comparison

may occur just as much to bolster uniqueness as to find a place in a cultural
context.' "
People engage in this comparative exercise to gauge many personal
characteristics, but central types of comparison often involve people's standing in a variety of hierarchies. This hierarchical positioning is not simply
determined by wealth or income in American culture, but instead can take
place through any number of other variables. Although in popular language,
4
we still talk about the upper class, the middle class, and the working class, 1
138.

Id.

139.

Id.

140. See Dale T. Miller & Deborah A. Prentice, The Construction of Social Norms and Standards, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 799 (E. Tory Higgins & Arie W.
Kruglanski eds., 1996). Thus, people tend to compare themselves to people who are similar enough
to make the comparison meaningful.
141.

Ladd Wheeler, A Brief History of Social Comparison Theory, in
supra note 134, at 3, 9-10.

SOCIAL COMPARISON:

CONTEMPORARY THEORY AND RESEARCH,

142.

Id.

143. Recent scholarship in this field has also highlighted group dynamics in status comparisons, underscoring that comparisons play out not only in terms of individual characteristics, but also
in terms of the perceived characteristics of groups with which people self-identify. See, e.g., Alison
Ledgerwood et al., Group-Identity Completion and the Symbolic Value of Property, 18 PSYCHOL.
Scl. 873, 873 (2007) (arguing that "property derives value from its capacity to serve as an effective
means in the pursuit of group-identity goals"). See generally SOCIAL COMPARISON AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 134.
144. See Jonah Berger & Chip Heath, Where Consumers Divergefrom Others: Identity Signaling and Product Domains, 34 J. CONSUMER RES. 121 (2007) (discussing the differentiation and
uniqueness literature in psychology and consumer research).
The New York Times, for example, recently ran an extended series entitled Class Matters,
145.
which divided Americans into the "Top Fifth," the "Upper Middle," the "Middle," the "Lower Middle," and "Bottom Fifth," exploring four "commonly used criteria for gauging class," specifically
occupation, education, income, and wealth. See, e.g., Janny Scott & David Leonhardt, Class in
America: Shadowy Lines That Still Divide, N.Y TIMES, May 15, 2005, at Al. This series was
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few subscribe to anything resembling the early Marxist view of strict
boundaries and inherent conflicts between a few well-defined classes. That
is not to say that economic status is not still one of the most important dividing lines in our society, but hierarchy in American culture is much more
complex.
As sociologists have explored, there are a number of micro-hierarchies
that reflect a host of status determinants. 46 Max Weber identified three basic.
axes along which social stratification occurs, dividing up stratification into
economic, prestige, and power elements. 47 As Weber emphasized, status on
one dimension does not necessarily equate to status on another dimension,
and in contemporary culture, the range of positional ladders that offer ways
of differentiating individuals have become much more complex than the
threefold schema Weber outlined. People today jockey for position based on
education, physical traits, associations, political power, cultural capital, and
any number of other determinants of hierarchy. 48 Nonetheless, property and
all that comes along with it remain central to many hierarchies, and increasingly so given the importance of consumption to modem identity.'49
Property, then, plays an important role in making relevant comparisons-both status related and otherwise-for reasons that parallel the power
of property in the symbolic interactionist literature. ' People generally have
a detailed sense of what gives particular objects significance, and property
conveys a great deal of information that most people deem relevant to selfevaluation and self-enhancement. Possessions are accordingly used to signal
both superiority (what I own sets me apart from those with lower status) and
the desire to emulate those perceived to be superior (what I own is just like
what elites own). 5'
controversial for its treatment of several matters but gives a strong indication of where mainstream
thinking about class is today.
146. See Roger V. Gould, The Origins of Status Hierarchies: A Formal Theory and Empirical
Test, 107 AM. J. Soc. 1143, 1143 (2002) ("[Alcross a wide range of scales and contexts, actors are
sorted into social positions that carry unequal rewards, obligations, and expectations.").
147.

MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 428-29 (Talcot"

Parsons ed., A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., The Free Press 1997) (1915). It is interesting
to note that Weber cited Veblen in his work on status, particularly for the connection between status
and coercive power represented through property. See Rudmin, supra note 43, at 51 (discussing
Weber and Veblen).
148. At a community level, public, nonprofit, or prominent private properties (such as museums or ever-taller skyscrapers) can have status dynamics associated with them. Public works are
often explicitly about community status, with communities touting the biggest building, the biggest
bridge, the best performing arts center, and the like.
149.

See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGMENT
(1984) (discussing the taste/consumer preference-status connection); Lewis Friedland et
al., Capital, Consumption, Communication, and Citizenship: The Social Positioning of Taste and
Civic Culture in the United States, 611 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCl. 31 (2007).
OF TASTE

150.

Cf Marsha L. Richins, Social Comparison, Advertising, and Consumer Discontent, 38

AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 593 (1995).

151. Cf Niklas Karlsson et al., Social Comparison and Consumer Behavior: When Feeling
Richer or Poorer Than Others Is More Important Than Being So, 35 J. APPLIED SoC. PSYCHOL.
1206, 1219-21 (2005).
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Social-comparison theory in some ways gives a neutral and technical
face to envy, one of the seven deadly sins. 1 2 But by recognizing the
deep-seated nature of the drive to compare and the self- and group-

regulating mechanisms that play out through this drive, social-comparison
theory has proven a remarkably fruitful body of scholarship." 3 The theory
underscores that there are a wide variety of hierarchical scales at work in
most social and cultural contexts, that most people have at least some instinct to internalize those scales, and that property in all of its forms stands
as a particularly rich marker for comparison.
3. PositionalGoods and the Economics of Status Races
If sociology and social psychology provide descriptions of how and why
people use property to signal relative status, economists have added interesting work on the consequences of the resulting status races. 5 4 There has long
been a grain in economic thinking that highlights the nature of demand as
driven by a regard for others, what McAdams calls an aspect of "relative
preferences."'' 5 This is often associated with Veblen's conspicuous consumption, but it has deeper roots and wider consequences.156
As Robert Frank has argued, a great many of the "prizes in life" are positional-"sought after less because of any absolute property they possess
than because they compare favorably with others in their own class.' 57
Frank, reflecting social-comparison insights on salience, notes that there is a
basic motivating mechanism that drives people to make local, as opposed to

152.
Cf. John Sabini & Maury Silver, Envy, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EMOTIONS
167, 172 (1986) (asserting that all status is inherently comparative).
153.
As noted above, some scholars have rooted comparative drives in biological factors as
well as social factors, but it is unnecessary to identify the source of this drive to acknowledge its
existence and relevance. See supra note 106.
154.
Although McAdams argued that recognition of status relations stood outside the mainstream of economics, and thus law and economics, see McAdams, supra note 13, there has been
much renewed interest in this topic, see, e.g., Laurie Simon Bagwell & B. Douglas Bemheim,
Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 349 n. 1 (1996)
(outlining research on "prestige" and "status" goods); Bill Dupor & Wen-fang Liu, Jealousy and
Equilibrium Overconsumption, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 423 (2003); Gertrud M. Fremling & Richard A.
Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, with ParticularApplication to Sexual Harassment, 147 U. PA.
L. REV. 1069, 1070-75 & n.2 (1999).
155.

McAdams, supra note 13, at 7-10.

156.

Within economics, a focus on comparative demand is often traced to JAMES S.

DUESENBERRY, INCOME, SAVING AND THE THEORY OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR (1949), which devel-

oped an early theory of consuming and saving that focused on individual decisions tied to general
levels of consumption and saving in society. Even earlier explorations can be traced to A.C. Pigou,
The Interdependence of Different Sources of Demand and Supply in a Market, 23 ECON. J. 19
(1913), which stated: "As regards demand, the essential matter is that people do, in fact, desire many
things, not merely for their own sake, but, in the main, on account of the reputation or distinction
which the possession of them confers." Id. at 20.
157.
FRANK, supra note 41, at 7 (citing FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH (1976), for
the term "positional goods").
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distant, comparisons in evaluating positional goods."' This competitive dynamic can generate what Frank calls a "positional treadmill," a prisoner's
dilemma in which goods (in the broad economics sense) that do not satisfy
relative preferences will tend to be under-consumed as people skew toward
goods that better signal position. 5 9
To translate this into terms more familiar in property literature, one can
think about conspicuous consumption and status races around property as a
form of the tragedy of the commons.' 60As with other such "tragedies," there
is a resource-goods that contribute to relative status-which would be collectively rational to consume at levels lower than what would occur when
people instead make individual decisions about their level of consumption.
If all consumers of positional goods could solve the coordination problems
inherent in needing to establish and reinforce hierarchies in this way, there
would be no need to use such goods to signal relative status, and the level of
consumption of positional goods would drop. But for a variety of reasonssome in the practical transaction-cost vein that economists have highlighted,
but many social and cultural-people do not generally coordinate around
status signaling.
Status races around positional goods generate observable consequences
for behavior connected to property. 16 For example, satisfying demand for
positional goods creates a conflict between consumption and saving. This
was first explored in depth by James Duesenberry, who argued that the only
way to account for the fact that savings rates are higher at higher levels of
income is the fact that people at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum must invest in more status-related goods as a percentage of their
income. This has been challenged by life-cycle and permanent-income
argument can be made that such alternative accounts
hypotheses, but a good
6
are less convincing. 1
A similar-and more property-specific-argument along the same lines
was recently offered by Luis Rayo and Gary Becker, who asserted that
158. Id. at 17-38. Frank notes that individuals can game local status races by choosing a
different "league" in which to compete-choosing to be a bigger frog in a comparatively smaller
pond, to use his metaphor. But Frank highlights the obvious costs of such status-related moves and
from this observation argues that an implicit market for relative status (purchasers having relatively
higher status and sellers having relatively lower status) operates in many situations.
159. Id. at 136-37.
160. See ROBERT FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF
ExcEss 207 (1999) (likening the incentives resulting from conspicuous consumption with those
creating excess pollution). British economist Richard Layard has made an even more explicit link

between relative inequality and the tragedy of the commons. See
LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE 35 (2005).

RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS:

Empirical work supports the status-seeking predicates of what Juliet Schor has described
161.
as the Veblenian account of consumption. See Robert L. Basmann et al., A Note on Measuring
Veblen's Theory of Conspicuous Consumption, 70 REV. ECON. & STAT. 531, 534 (1988) (drawing
post-World War 1 commodity-expenditure data for empirical support); Chao & Schor, supra note
123, at 108; Schor, supra note 97, at 16.
supra note 156, at 29-32, 45.

162.

DUESENBERRY,

163.

See FRANK, supra note 41, at 146-49 (discussing these theories).
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goods that have more obvious status-related attributes tend to be durable.64

Durable goods tend to require more borrowing, leading to excessive debt
and less financial savings.16 The common intuition behind these observations
is that positional goods skew decisions toward things than can better reinforce status, regardless of utility. As we shall see, this adds an important
conceptual point to understanding how status signaling changes conceptions
of the work of property.
C. Synthesis and Reflections

Historical and contemporary interdisciplinary perspectives on status signaling through property suggest the outlines of a general theoretical
framework. This Section provides a synthesis and further details of that
framework and then notes some questions this perspective might raise.
1. The Boundariesof Status Signaling Through Property

What emerges from the preceding discussion is a vision of the work of
property grounded in several core assumptions about human nature and social organization. Social interaction gives symbolic meaning to the material
world, with people constantly sending and receiving messages about property. People form their sense of self at least in part by comparison to others,
with property serving as a particularly important and informational metric

for that comparison. And this comparative process around property generates status races that influence many aspects of how people interact with and
through property.
This construct brings to the fore the ubiquitous role that property plays
in marking, defining, and policing status boundaries. As Goffman noted, the

"universal characteristic" of status differentiation is that it requires "adequate

communication."'6

Property provides

a

particularly

powerful

symbolic language for this communication, with the status-related aspects of
property presenting a communicative structure that is adaptive, culturally
sensitive, and generally pervasive.6 6 And in our consumer culture,

164. Luis Rayo & Gary S. Becker, Peer Comparisonsand Consumer Debt, 73 U. CHi. L. REV.
231 (2006). For further discussion of the nature of durable goods in status comparisons, see infra
text accompanying notes 174-76.
165.

Rayo & Becker, supra note 164, at 232.

166. Erving Goffman, Symbols of Class Status, 2 BRaIT. J. Soc. 294, 294 (1951); see also
William H. Form & Gregory P.Stone, Urbanism,Anonymity, and Status Symbolism, 62 AM. J. Soc.
504 (1957) (exploring Goffman's communication structure across varying social settings).
167. While status may be a particularly noteworthy category of information that property
communicates, it is by no means the only message. For example, purchasing and driving a Prius
may send a kind of hierarchical message ("I'm more environmentally conscious than Hummer drivers are"), but it also sends messages about environmental consciousness, comfort with technology,
and the like. Likewise, an SUV may signal wealth in general terms (and some models more than
others) but, to some consumers, it also represents sportiness, a love of the outdoors, or safety consciousness. This variety of messages can hold true for types property beyond large-scale consumer
items.
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information relating to property is all the more intense because of a variety
of cultural and market institutions generating and reinforcing that information. Everything from magazines and entire cable channels devoted to
shopping to the internet to the pervasive advertising that saturates so much
of our daily lives revolves around communication through material goods.
We are bombarded by messages about property, 68and there is evidence that
we internalize those messages from an early age.1
Property is a particularly important locus for comparative communication, moreover, because so many aspects of property can be imbued with
status. Economists have explored so-called "status" or "prestige" goods,
examining when an element of the price consumers are willing to pay reflects the status-reinforcing messages associated with a given good. 69
Harvey Leibenstein famously broke down the elements of consumer demand
shaped by others into three variations. First, what he labeled "bandwagon
effects" reflect a desire to wear, buy, do, consume, and behave like peers,
with the consumer intending to emulate other owners of the product.' 70 Here,
the more people who are perceived to want a product, the more desirable a
product becomes. Next, "snob effects" conversely reflect consumer demand
related to the perceived rarity of the product-the harder an object is to obtain (because it is hard to make, more expensive to buy, or the like), the
higher the price premium associated with the object, independent of any
underlying functionality. Finally, "Veblen effects" provide a catchall category for generic conspicuous consumption, where demand for a product
increases as its perceived status increases."'

Although economists tend to put this third category into something of a
black box, there is much depth and texture to the details through which
property can confer perceived status. Of course, some things are seen as
prestigious for their inherent attributes-the largest car, the smallest radio.
And, on some level, quality may be a sign of status. 73 Indeed, the very durability of so much of property reinforces its centrality in communicating
status. 74 This can be tied to physical durability-the fact that a house or fine
clothing lasts longer than ephemeral goods magnifies the potential signaling

168.

Russell W. Belk et al., Developmental Recognition of Consumption Symbolism, 9 J.

CONSUMER RES. 4 (1982); see also JULIET B. SCHOR, BORN TO BuY 13, 19 (2004).

169. E.g., Bagwell & Bernheim, supra note 154, at 350 (modeling "Veblen effects" as "a
willingness to pay a higher price for a functionally equivalent good" due to "the desire to signal
wealth"). Veblen himself famously illustrated this phenomenon with the example of silver utensils
for eating, which although much more expensive than utensils made of other material, are not any
more useful and may be less so. VEBLEN, supra note 17, at 85-86.
170. See H. Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers'
Demand, 64 Q.J. EcON. 183, 190 (1950).
171.

Id. at 199.

172.

Id. at 202-05; Bagwell & Bemheim, supra note 154, at 349-50.

173. Conversely, as anthropologists have pointed out, "quality" can simply be a function of
objects' abilities to serve as "rank markers." DOUGLAS & ISHERWOOD, supra note 5, at 117-18.
174.

See Rayo & Becker, supra note 164, at 232.
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effect, all things being equal.175 It can also be tied to how strong the signal
is-as in 71the
case of a particularly memorable meal used to impress
6
neighbors.
Status can attach not only to the quality or functional dimensions of an
object but also to its location. The proverbial comer office, for example,
may be bigger and have nicer views, but it also has deep cultural significance. So, too, particular neighborhoods or particular areas can take on
status salience that has something to do with their physical characteristics,
but as much if not more to do with psychology and social dynamics. 78 In
Manhattan, this can extend to desirable blocks or even particularly "hot"
buildings. Thus, there is a deep link between status and place, which can be
a function of proximity or distance, uniqueness, or a particular cultural context.
Cultural meaning can attach to other attributes of property as well. The
novelty of a thing, for example, can be a most important status marker-as
the lines outside an Apple store before the newest product is released can
attest. There may also be an insider/outsider dynamic associated with certain
goods, where it is less a resource's rarity and more its association with certain groups (which can themselves be high or low status) that sends the
relevant signal. The spread of hip-hop culture to the suburbs and grunge
style both reflect this kind of appropriation of meaning. And some products
are desirable precisely
because they suggest a resistance to any kind of
79
group identity. 1
There can also be a status dynamic around perceptions of elite preferences, with status cascading from that perception. Unlike Leibenstein's
snob goods, the status appeal here derives from association with the preferences of those who themselves have status, whether through wealth,
celebrity, or other sources of cultural power. 8' Although it is open to debate
how successful such associations are, appeals to this kind of linkage have
long been, and continue to be, as familiar in advertising as the face on the
front of the Wheaties box or behind a wrist wearing a TAG Heuer watch.
Not all property, of course, will signal status in the same way and not all
property will even signal. 182 There is empirical evidence that people's sense
175.

Id.

176.

Id. at 233-34.

177. Nicholas Blomley, Landscapes of Property, 32 LAW & Soc'. REV. 567 (1998) (discussing the social construction of space).
178. See FRANK, supra note 160, at 28-29 (describing premiums commanded in real estate for
views and "choice" locations).
179.

See Berger & Heath, supra note 144.

180.

See FRANK, supra note 160, at 3-4.

181.
groups).

Cf.

BOURDIEU,

supra note 149 (discussing the taste-preferences of different social

182. Cf Fredrik Carlsson et al., Do You Enjoy Having More than Others? Survey Evidence of
PositionalGoods, 74 ECONOMICA 586, 590-96 (2007) (describing survey evidence that suggests that
some goods, such as income and cars, have more positional value than others, such as leisure and
car safety). Indeed, in some communities, there is arguably a negative association between property
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of the meaning of their property varies based on gender and age and may
vary on racial and ethnic grounds-which is not surprising, given the
culturally embedded nature of the meaning of things.183 One should be careful about being essentialist in reflecting on this evidence, but several studies
have shown gender variations in which possessions are most valued and on
what basis,18 as well as significant life-cycle variation.
The distinction, moreover, that economists have drawn between observable and unobservable goods is relevant here: for property to signal it must
either be observable or its existence must be readily inferable."' But even
property that is not directly observable can send proxy signals, as when
owning a house in a given neighborhood carries a status signal even for
those who never set foot in that neighborhood. 117 Thus, one of the things that
is interesting about the signaling effect of place (particularly residence) is
that it is mobile: people can use where they live to communicate a wealth of
information about themselves without anyone actually directly seeing or
experiencing the underlying property. This essentially multiplies the effect
of the status signal that certain kinds of property can send.
Part of the particular power of property to signal status in our contemporary culture, finally, is that many other status determinants are generally out
of bounds. There are very few taboos as powerful, for example, as not talking (directly) about how much people earn, even though income is one of
the
evaluating
Andat there
declaring,
least
are most
deeplyimportant
engrainedmetrics
habits for
in most
social socioeconomic
settings againststatus.""

and status-what might be considered an anti-property attitude, where members of the community
who display property too overtly can be ostracized. And, in some cultural contexts giving away
property can confer status in much the same way that obtaining and displaying property generally
does in our culture.
183. Cf MARGARET
culture of property).

JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY

170 (1993) (discussing the

184. E.g., CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & ROCHBERG-HALTON, supra note 7, at 105-12; Floyd W.
Rudmin, Gender differences in the semantics of ownership: A quantitativephenomenologicalsurvey
study, 15 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 487, 504 (1994).
185. E.g., Lita Furby, Possessions: Toward a Theory of Their Meaning and Function
Throughout the Life Cycle, 1 LIFESPAN DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 297 (Paul B. Baltes ed.,
1978); James W. Gentry et al., The Role of Possessions in Creating, Maintaining, and Preserving
One's Identity: Variation Over the Life Course, 22 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 413 (1995). Some
studies, moreover, have adduced evidence that conspicuous consumption varies by race. E.g., Chao
& Schor, supra note 123, at 124; Kerwin Kofi Charles et al., Conspicuous Consumption and Race
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13392, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=10 14340.
186. Robert H. Frank, The Demand for Unobservable and Other Nonpositional Goods, 75
AM. ECON. REV. 101, 107-08 (1985); McAdams, supra note 13, at 5; see also Marsha L. Richins,
Valuing Things: The Public and Private Meanings of Possessions, 21 J. CONSUMER REs. 504, 51618 (1994) (discussing the dual nature of value in possessions as generating public and private meaning). It is worth noting that, at a certain extreme level of wealth, privacy itself can become a luxury
good.
187.

Cf Fennell, supra note 20, at 1054-59 (discussing home ownership and status).

188. There is some evidence that among the generation raised on MySpace and Facebook, this
taboo may be weakening. See Alex Williams, Not-So-PersonalFinance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008,
at STI.
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too explicitly, other relevant markers of status-which, as noted, tend to be
quite culturally contextual. To the extent that social mobility is fluid, possessions
serve
as
adaptive
proxies
for
communication.' Visible proxies thus become all the more significant, enhancing the power of the indirect signals that property can send.
Moreover, proxy signals for evaluating status, including property, can
gain even more strength because in some circumstances, rather than being
compelled to make social comparisons by a desire for self-evaluation or
self-enhancement, individuals prefer to avoid comparison altogether. Some
scholars have argued that because social comparison will almost always
result in one party being perceived as inferior, which can generate negative
feelings with corresponding negative social ramifications for both parties,
individuals sometimes prefer to avoid making explicit social comparisons in
face-to-face interactions.' This avoidance of explicit communication about
status can make alternative signals that much more significant.
In short, a synthesis of theories of property and relative status must reflect the social meanings instantiated through property and the many
dimensions of the practical aspects of property that can embody status.
Property is not the only way in which people differentiate, but it remains a
central tool that people use to define and understand themselves in relation
to others.
2. Notes of Caution and Some Responses

Any general understanding of property and status signaling is vulnerable
to critique, and it is worth acknowledging the limits of the framework outlined above. To begin, perhaps the most obvious rejoinder to the assertion
that a fundamental aspect of the work of property is signaling relative status
is that the assertion begs an empirical question of how significant this role is
compared to the other work that property is doing in any given instance.' 9' In
response, it might be possible to rely on the strength of the intuitive claim or
on the kind of armchair empiricism that undergirds so much of legal literature, although there is at least some empirical support for the ubiquity of the
phenomenon. It is also possible, however, to stake a claim that is not so vulnerable: that the status-oriented aspects of property serve as a kind of
gravitational force-stronger in some instances, weaker in others, but always present.
A narrower version of this critique might be that even if the gravitational
pull of status applies to a few categories of property, such as the obvious
189.

Rudmin, supra note 43, at 55.

190. Philip Brickman & Ronnie Janoff Bulman, Pleasureand Pain in Social Comparison, in
SOCIAL COMPARISON PROCESSES, supra note 136, at 149, 152, 156-57.
191. There is some scholarship, moreover, that calls into question the use of possessions as
status symbols. E.g., Rudmin, supra note 43, at 55 (reviewing studies). But this work, while reminding that the symbolic nature of property is highly contextual, stands in contrast to the significant
theoretical and empirical literature undergirding the idea that property is a ubiquitous status symbol.
See supra Sections H.A-B.
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status symbols on which Veblen and his descendants focused, the dynamic is
not terribly relevant to the broad sweep of what constitutes property, from
corporate shares to hard-rock minerals to ideas. It is true that much of the
research on symbolic interaction and social comparison that is relevant to
property focuses on a handful of obvious categories-clothes, cars, food,
homes, and the like. These all are relatively accessible and largely consumer-oriented objects. Likewise, economists have largely focused a narrow
class of essentially luxury goods.
However, the significance of property's signaling function extends beyond consumer items and luxury goods.' 92 First, as discussed above, it has

been shown empirically that many types of property beyond those kinds of
goods serve this function. Indeed, commentators have noted the signaling
effect of even the most seemingly generic property-money.' 93 More important, habits of mind developed in dealing with one aspect of property can
shape how individuals approach other interactions around property. Thus,
how people come to internalize the comparative urge expressed through
more personal property can bleed over and shape general approaches to consumption and accumulation.
Any account of property that accentuates psychological aspects of possession must acknowledge the significant amount of property that is held in
ways that minimize the individual connection to property, such as ownership
by entities or forms of joint ownership. While this kind of distant or disaggregated ownership complicates claims about both those who communicate
through property and those who receive that communication, it does not
fundamentally undermine them. Entities act through individuals and those
individuals do not lose their psychological depths simply because they are
acting on behalf of an organization or corporation. Accordingly, the status
signaling that attends to property may be filtered in interesting ways when
individuals act in collective capacities, but the communication does not
cease.
As to how the competitive dynamic plays out along socioeconomic
lines, it might be argued that status signaling is important for relatively
higher-status individuals, but declines in significance rapidly for those for
whom daily necessities-food, shelter, medical care-are a consistent challenge. This is a fair point, and there is clearly a connection between the
amount of disposable income or wealth and the ability to engage in outward
displays of status consumption. But as a number of commentators have observed, consumption patterns at the higher levels of socioeconomic status
tend to drive consumption patterns throughout society.' 94 The consequences

of having to signal status may indeed be greater precisely for those for

192. As Frank has argued, status races play out in a wide variety of markets. See FRANK,
supra note 41, at 87-108.
193. See, e.g.,
58-63 (1980).

194.

See, e.g.,

HENRY CLAY LINDGREN, GREAT EXPECTATIONS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MONEY

DOUGLAS & ISHERWOOD,

supra note 5, at 182; VEBLEN, supra note 17.
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whom choices to consume in particular ways entail more painful tradeoffs,
such as consumption for durable goods versus for health care and the like.' 95
A final note of caution one might sound is the question whether the
comparative dynamics that play out through property are as significant today as they have been in other periods in our history. Indeed, some
commentators have argued that we are in a post-materialist phase of our
culture where people sort themselves
/ 96less on socioeconomic grounds and
more on a variety of cultural grounds.
If anything, while material culture may be losing its primacy in defining
status, it is still central and reaches through all segments of society. As Juliet
Schor has argued, there is "little question that consuming is a, if not 'the,'
realm of agency in contemporary society."'97 Smith may have drawn a sharp
distinction between the ability of the rich and the poor to "draw ... the attention of the world"' 9s--that is, to signal with property-and Veblen of
course may have focused on the "leisure class."' 99 But modem consumer
culture has democratized consumption to an extent that might have been
unimaginable in Smith's time and even perhaps Veblen's, with the corresponding consequence that status consumption has become a much more
thoroughly engrained aspect of everyone's daily life.
It is true, moreover, that active and engaged consumption has become
more of a reality than the image of the passive shopper that Madison Avenue
traditionally targeted.)° But even empowered consumers can still place great
value on the symbolic aspects of consumption. Indeed, the costs associated
with gathering and processing the information that can imbue property with
status are arguably dropping, as the ready availability of once-private information continues to grow.2 0'
It may be, as one scholar recently argued, that the emerging availability
of virtual worlds could fundamentally disrupt our present patterns of con202
sumption. In a culture in which consumption was disassociated from
materiality, status races that played out through virtual property might raise
fewer normative concerns than their material counterparts. That, however, is
not yet the world in which we live, and the continuing relevance of modem
understandings of conspicuous consumption and status races seem far from
195. Cf. Charles et al., supra note 185, at 32 (finding that consumption of visible goods accounts for sixty percent of the difference in spending between whites and minorities on education,
health care, food, and housing).
196. See, e.g., RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURE SHIFT IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 66,
103 (1990).
197.

Schor, supra note 97, at 24.

198.

SMITH, supra note 88, at 71.

199.

VEBLEN,

supra note 17.

200. See Schor, supra note 97, at 23-24 (discussing the emergence, and limits, of "agentic"
consumption).
201. One can access, for example, web sites such as http://www.zillow.com to get an instant
estimate not only of the value of your own home, but also of the homes of all of your neighbors.
202.

Albert C. Lin, Virtual Consumption: A Second Life for Earth?, 2008 BYU L. REv. 47,
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fading. This continuing relevance resonates particularly in how we conceptualize, and often valorize, the work of property.
III.

STATUS COMPARISON AS CRITIQUE IN PROPERTY THEORY

The long intellectual tradition and active contemporary scholarship on
status signaling through property sheds important new light on each of the
three primary discourses that shape contemporary property theory. Understanding this phenomenon, however, offers more than descriptive richness: it
strongly suggests grounds for normative concern as well.
Each discourse has engendered what might be considered external critiques. Economic perspectives on incentives and allocation have been
criticized, for example, for ignoring distributive justice. Privileging personhood, as Radin acknowledged, risks fetishizing property. Communitarian
perspectives may unduly ignore individual autonomy. By contrast, this Article's functionalist engagement with property as a tool to signal relative
status provides an internal critique for each of these discourses.
Taking each vision of property on its own terms, then, this Part argues
that status signaling complicates the work of property that each vision presents. Adding this layer does not negate the undeniable insights
undergirding each discourse, as status signaling can have positive and negative consequences. Acknowledging the positive, this Part focuses primarily
on what is normatively troubling about how people interact with and
through property as a result of status signaling, in the spirit of Joseph
Singer's observation that the "most fundamental paradox of property is that
we may best understand it by exploring the tensions-the contradictionswithin it."2 °3

This Part accordingly draws on the theoretical insights outlined in Part II
to examine the normative consequences of status signaling for each discourse. First, to the extent that consumption demands associated with
property are particularly vulnerable to cooptation in status races, property's
incentive and allocative functions can systematically fail, misallocating resources and undermining the welfare-maximizing function associated with
trades around property. Likewise, to the extent that property is used to signal
relative status, property's importance to individual identity can be warped by
aspects of identity and personhood that are too closely tied to comparison.
Finally, property's propensity to signal status is both propelled by and has
the potential to undermine the very social relations that are said to define
property. This Part explores these insights in turn and then concludes by
arguing that status signaling provides a surprising theoretical bridge linking
these otherwise disparate theoretical constructs.

203.

SINGER, ENTITLEMENT,

supra note 66, at 205.
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A. Over-Incentivizing,Misallocation,and Status Races

For the first discourse-property as an institution to incentivize production and allocate scarce resources-incorporating an understanding of status
signaling through property has the potential to undermine the welfare enhancements that economists and economically oriented legal scholars
conventionally associate with a regime of strong property rights. Status signaling creates some potentially positive incentives that cannot be dismissed
lightly, but on the whole risks distorting both the incentive and the allocative function that property (with contract) is said to serve.
To begin, status races can lead to misallocation of resources because
they tend to foster investment in and consumption of the kinds of observable
status benefits that more property, generally speaking, can bring. The desire
to have more possessions can lead to over-incentivizing productive activities-a general tendency to prefer more property, all things considered. This
risks over-incentivizing property-related production and investments to satisfy inherently positional needs, given the particularly strong role • that
205
property plays in signaling status. Frank made this argument generically,
but it applies with particular strength to property as opposed to other potential choices that individuals could make in terms of development and
distribution of resources. And this concern may have the greatest force for
those least able to afford this trade-off.
This potential misallocation problem raises several normative concerns
• 206
that parallel long-standing critiques of materialism and mass consumpton.
On an individual level, these critiques highlight the psychological harms of
materialist orientation' °7 and the negative consequences that flow from defining oneself and one's priorities through material things, as opposed to
experiences, relationships, spirituality, and the like.0 8 On a societal level,
status races that overly privilege property also evoke the negative environmental consequences of the2 9 consumption or ecological footprint that such
incentives tend to generate. 0
There is a separate, but closely related, misallocation problem that status
can generate for property. Within the general category of property, status
concerns can lead individuals to choose possessions that are status-related
204. See, e.g., Fremling & Posner, supra note 154, at 1074 ("In a dynamic society, such as
that of the United States, the desire to enhance one's status is generally a spur to socially beneficial
rivalry. People in a society that is open, mobile, and competitive usually cannot obtain high status
without achievements, so status rivalry motivates people to work harder than they would otherwise.
Unless they can appropriate the entire social product of their harder work, they confer external benefits.").
205.

See supratext accompanying notes 157-59.

206.

See generally SCHOR, supra note 18.

207. See, e.g., Leaf Van Boven, Experientialism, Materialism, and the Pursuit of Happiness,9
REv. GEN. PsYcHOL. 132 (2005) (discussing research findings on materialism and happiness).
208.

See, e.g., TIM KASSER, THE HIGH PRICE OF MATERIALISM 87-95 (2002).

209. See William E. Rees, Ecological footprints and appropriated carrying capacity: what
urban economics leaves out, ENV'T. & URBANIZATION, Oct. 1992, at 121.
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over possessions that are not. Thus, not only will individuals potentially
over-invest in property generically speaking, but will tend to invest in statusenhancement over functionally equivalent but non-status-enhancing property.2" In more accessible terms, the drive for status through property may
generically cause people to seek things whose overriding purpose is simply
to reinforce hierarchy.
The concern here echoes the critique of materialism, but an individual
can be overly materialistic and suffer from the significant negative effects
that have been shown to flow from that outlook, entirely without regard to
relative position. Here, instead, the concern is that because status-related
objects are valued on a relative basis, the desire for status-related objects
may lead people to strive for property that lacks utility or intrinsic meaning.
A final misallocation concern associated with status arises from the need
to invest resources to police both the determinants of status and the boundaries of status categories. As Goffman pointed out, because status symbols
are inherently representational, communication through such symbols carries the inherent risk of fraud."' This, in turn, requires "mechanisms for
restricting the opportunities that arise for misrepresentation."2 2 In property
terms, this requires investing resources in monitoring the material trappings
of status and responding to transgressions against established status boundaries. Because such resources could otherwise be invested in productive
activity of various sorts, the need to shore up indeterminate status markers
(often by over-investing in status-related resources) and to ensure that others
are not manipulating the symbols of status alters incentive structures around
property.
Indeed, status consumption may incentivize risk taking to satisfy relative
preferences in a particularly socially wasteful manner. The current credit
crisis, with its roots in single-family mortgages that were a stretch for many
consumers,"' illustrates behavior that appears irrational by standard economic metrics but that responded at least in part to incentives derived from
the symbolic meaning of home ownership. That there has been not only a
significant state infrastructure promoting that symbolic meaning,2 4 but an
active industry stoking this element of demand makes it no less significant a
factor in individual calculations of buying versus renting.
210.
J.

See Marsha L. Richins & Floyd W. Rudmin, Materialism and economic psychology, 15
217, 218 (1994).

ECON. PSYCHOL.

211.

Goffman, supra note 166, at 296.

212.

Id.

213. See Stuart R. Berkowitz, The Subprime Mortgage Mess-A Primerto Assist Investors, 64
J. Mo. B. 122, 123 (2008).
214. The government, particularly the federal government, directly promotes home ownership
primarily through the federal income-tax deduction for mortgage interest and property taxes. See
ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HoUsING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 69-76 (2006). But there is also a
significant policy apparatus actively selling the more abstract value of home ownership. See, e.g.,
George W. Bush, Proclamation No. 8263, 73 Fed. Reg. 31,747 (May 29, 2008) ("For many Americans, owning a home represents freedom, independence, and the American dream. During National
Homeownership Month, we highlight the benefits of owning a home and encourage our fellow
citizens to be responsible homeowners.").
HeinOnline -- 107 Mich. L. Rev. 796 2008-2009

March 2009]

Propertyand Relative Status

The centrality of relative preferences in property also complicates the
exchange side of this property discourse, adding a decided note of caution to
the pragmatic workings of Coasian bargaining. As McAdams has noted,
"making someone absolutely better off may itself make others worse off if
the others prefer to maintain a certain economic position relative to the one
whose wealth is increased."2 5 If people trade not just to satisfy their own

needs but also to gain relative status, the mechanism of transfers is much
more vulnerable to breakdown over positional strategic behaviors
than its
16
veneration in the law and economics literature would suggest.1
A final normative consequence of recognizing the role of status races
through property is that the satisfaction people derive from property may be
unstable and less likely to yield well-being than standard utilitarian accounts

assume. In what is known as the Easterlin paradox, after the finding by
economist Richard Easterlin that higher national income does not accord

with higher levels of subjective well-being,217 a number of studies have
found that increased wealth does not translate into increased happiness.
Similarly, studies have shown that experiential purchases yield greater wellbeing than material purchases, 29 assuming a certain level of basic material

sufficiency.
One aspect of the Easterlin paradox and related work on comparative

hedonics is that relative position may generate more well-being than absolute material wealth. This may be because people become inured to the
positive effects of a certain level of consumption and then have to consume
more to achieve the same psychological reaction. 220 If this is fueled by com-

parison through property, the welfare enhancement associated with more
property may not be direct, or in some circumstances even real. Thus, the

move from a 1500-square-foot house to one that is 2500 square feet may not
be as individually welfare enhancing as would first appear if the move
brings one into contact with the 4000-square-foot house across the street.
215.

McAdams, supra note 13, at 4-5 (emphasis omitted).

216.

See id.at15-16.

217. Richard A. Easterlin, Does Money Buy Happiness?, 30 PUB. INT. 3 (1973); Richard A.
Easterlin, Will raising the incomes of all
increase the happiness of all?, 27 J. EcON. BEHAV. & ORG.
35 (1995).
218. Easterlin's data have been challenged. E.g., Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox (Aug. 25, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l 121237. But there is additional
research supporting the tenuousness of the link, beyond subsistence, between absolute wealth and
happiness. See Andrew E. Clark et al., Relative Income, Happiness and Utility: An Explanation for
the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles (June 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=998225.
219.

E.g., Leaf Van Boven & Thomas Gilovich, To Do or to Have? That Is the Question, 85 J.
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 1193 (2003) (discussing research on experiential purchases versus
material purchases).
PERSONALITY

220. There is a growing literature on people's adaptation to changing conditions, particularly
reactions to negative events and ability to gauge accurately how positive events will change people's
subjective sense of well-being. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses 13-17 (AEI-Brookings
Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 07-07, July 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=9838 10.
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When everyone starts buying bigger houses, as has happened in our country
over the past fifty years, the welfare gains supposedly associated with increased consumption of property may disappear altogether.
These normative concerns raise some tension with an important, if often
implicit, assumption in much of the literature on property's role in incentives and allocation, namely the utilitarian default that preferences are value
neutral. Under this assumption, there should be nothing inherently normatively troubling about satisfying relative preferences-preferences for more
property because more property connotes higher status or for property that
connotes higher status over other kinds of property. Such preferences, the
argument would go, are no less entitled to satisfaction than any other preference.
In response, it would be possible to note that the assumption of value
neutrality has long been challenged and critiques about materialism and ecological harm fit comfortably within a normative tradition that does not
concede that all preference satisfaction is equal. This may be true, but in
some sense does not accept the largely utilitarian framework that focuses on
property's role in incentives and allocation. Even within this framework,
however, a number of scholars have identified the negative externalities that
can flow from the satisfaction of relative preferences.22 Thus, status-related
preferences can generate identifiable harms (although they will not always
do so), and they can also alter the work that otherwise neutral preference
satisfaction through property is generally thought to achieve.
Ultimately, then, if a central aspect of the incentive rationale that undergirds this vision of property is security, the proposition that property tends
to generate status races may call into question some of the unexamined justifications for the sanctity of security. What is protected through strong
property rights-through "property rules," in Calabresi and Melamed's
terms-is less solid than the conventional literature assumes, as the value of
that security rests to a certain degree on the shifting sands of comparison.
B. A Fun-HouseMirrorfor the Looking-Glass Self:
Warping Identity and Personhood

As to the second major property discourse, the status-signaling effect of
property can provide new ground to question any unalloyed veneration of
property's role in identity. As with the resources that can be wasted or misallocated acquiring positional goods and policing status, the temptation to
mask identity and the symbolic nature of the communication expressed
through possessions changes the nature of the property-personhood link. If a
central way in which property operates in the world is as a pervasive source
of status signaling, then property may have as much potential to warp identity as to embody or foster it. This can invest the individual relationship with
221.
E.g., McAdams, supra note 13, at 55-59 (identifying conditions under which the satisfaction of "inherently conflicting preferences" misallocates resources toward zero-sum competition
and creates social waste).
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the material things of the world with a potentially dysfunctional regard for
other people's property.
There can, again, be a positive aspect to forming identity by regard to
others, through property or by emulation of positive traits. There may be any
number of grounds on which the aspirational aspects of comparison are not
only motivating, as Smith pointed out, but also appropriately helpful in delineating elements of identity. But seeking to bolster a sense of self through
outdoing or trying to catch up with perceived comparators through property
222
seems particularly pernicious. What generates meaning about possessions
may be as much about external forces as the particular kind of internal
forces on which Radin focused. There is something less authentic about
symbolic meaning generated by cultural forces that are mass produced and
depend, at core, on tying the personal-property relationship to the meaning
given to objects by popular culture.
The sense of self this comparative process generates, moreover, is unstable in the sense that any personal connection formed to one's possessions
will tend to require adjustment as others acquire or change their possessions.
The meaning of home, of clothing, of any other resource can thus shift to
the extent it is tied to the homes, clothes, or resources of others. The personhood reified through these material objects may reflect the choices of others
as much as individual meaning.
In terms of justifications for legal entitlements, recognizing this dynamic
can complicate the priorities that Radin outlined. Recall Radin's normative
claim that attention to personhood can yield a structure of entitlements that
gives greater weight, in some circumstances, to "personal" property than to
"fungible" property.2 3 This justificatory structure has been criticized for
ignoring the potential personhood-reinforcing aspects of fungible prop224
erty, and for under-appreciating the role of commodification in creating
the conditions through which personal attachments might form. 2" These
critiques ultimately miss Radin's basic point that it is legitimate in structuring entitlements to recognize the importance of the investment of the self in
the material world.226
It is also possible, however, that because certain kinds of property function most vigorously to reinforce status distinctions, the argument for giving
a preference in law to the protection of those objects may lose some force.
222. To be clear, as with the externalities that status-related consumption and the drive for
positional goods can generate, identifying the negative aspects of identity formation through property-related comparisons focuses on what is potentially harmful about the cycle. This is not an
argument that the drive to compare is inherently negative.
223.

See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.

224. E.g., Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism:A Critique of Radin's Theory of
Propertyand Personhood,45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 391 & n.209 (1993).
225.
MARKET

E.g.,

JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE

TRIUMPH OF VENUS: THE EROTICS OF THE

66-74 (2004).

226. For an argument, however, that privileging property in legal theory on personhood
grounds lacks an empirical basis, see Stem, supra note 52 (manuscript at 4) ("[T]here is little evidence that any possession is constitutive of personhood or necessary for human flourishing.").

HeinOnline -- 107 Mich. L. Rev. 799 2008-2009

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 107:757

Drawing the line between what is truly "personal" in a more internally generated sense and what is overly focused on invidious comparison may be
quite difficult, and this is not to suggest some overly simple judicial heuristic. But possessions acquired to match the status of others or to reinforce
status barriers seem to form a less compelling basis for protection.
C. Reinforcing Hierarchy in Property's CommunitarianWeb

Returning to our final discourse, property's very interconnectedness may
reinforce the institution's capacity to fuel competitive consumption and
warp preferences. Compared to property's role in structuring incentives and
allocating resources or its role in forming identity, understanding status signaling serves as less of a conceptual corrective for the discourse on property
as social relations. What status signaling adds to this vision of property is
more complex than its relationship with the other two discourses.
To begin, part of the linkages that property forms, on a practical level,
involves social comparisons and detailed, closely observed personal assessments of relative status. In a society in which property actually operated in
the way that the Blackstonian isolationist image suggested, as a zone of exclusion that allowed owners to shut their backs on society, there would be
little of substance to the comparative dynamic. If, instead, possessions
radiate messages, and particularly messages about relative status, the social
embeddedness of property can magnify those signals. Thus, the more conscious we are of the possessions of others, the more that the social linkages
that property forms may serve to magnify the communication of relative
positioning. It may be, then, that the more we are bound as a community
through property, the more property communicates relative status.
There is an emerging empirical literature that examines so-called contagious behavior. Everything from the use of social services to criminal
activity to unemployment to a large number of consumer choices to even
more counterintuitive examples such as smoking cessation and weight gain
has been linked to social networks. 22' The precise process through which
social networks shape individual behavior is an as-yet-unanswered question
in the research, but the transmission of norms through social comparison is
at least a part of the phenomenon. Accordingly, the more property operates
to link individuals, the more the strength of the social network may, in effect, increase the signal strength of the messages that property sends.
Next, with respect to the normative vision of property as social obligation, the malleability of the signals that property communicates can interact
with this communitarian ideal in positive and negative ways. A mutual understanding of shared values can reinforce a collective sense of community

227.

See supra note 32.

228. E.g., Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Collective Dynamics of Smoking in
a Large Social Network, 358 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2249 (2008); Nicholas A. Christakis & James H.
Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social Network Over 32 Years, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED.
370 (2007).
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reflected through property. Indeed, a shared sense of position in status competition can be a bond against other communities, as group-identity theory
in social comparison suggests. 229 But status signaling can also be used to
reify the negative aspects of community, as people tacitly agree to
strengthen the determinants of status against outsiders. This certainly seems
to be a dynamic, for example, in the fractured structure of municipal government and, at an even more fine-grained level, the operation of many
common-interest communities. The common bonds of one columunity,
then, can magnify exclusion of others.
Ultimately, these observations do not yield, as with the two other discourses, any particular grounds for questioiing the prescriptive agenda that
undergirds the social-relations discourse. If social-relations theories, given
their breadth, have a unifying normative theme, it is that the definition of
property itself represents a balance between individual and collective concerns. Theorists in this tradition have accordingly been keenly aware of the
nature of power imbalances reflected in property, but none have focused
particularly on status signaling as an aspect of that imbalance. Understanding property's tendency to signal status does not change the unavoidability
of undertaking that balance, but it can add one ground on which individual
assertions may be understood as less atomistic and inward looking. The interconnectedness of property can thus be seen as an engine that
unexpectedly has the potential to accelerate the very power imbalances on
which thinkers in this tradition have focused.
D. Status Signalingas a TheoreticalBridge

We have now seen how property's status-signaling function adds important complications to three foundational discourses in contemporary
property theory, but before turning to a closer examination of the intersection between status signaling and the details of property law, one somewhat
counterintuitive aspect of this discussion bears noting. In property scholarship, discourses that emphasize incentives or identity or social relations are
often seen as in tension, if not mutually exclusive. Although pluralism is an
important conceptual tool in contemporary property theory, even pluralist
accounts tend to privilege one or another aspect of property theory within
the mosaic.232

Unpacking the connection between property and status signaling, however, provides a theoretical bridge between otherwise disparate ways of
229.

See supra note 143.

230.

For discussion of the role of law in instantiating these markers of status, see infra Part IV.

231. See Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralismin Property Law, 61
REV. 1597 (2008).

VAND.

L.

232. Although pluralist theories resist the tendency to assert normative and functional priorities, they, too, often devolve to assertions of normative or instrumental preference. See, e.g.,
STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 292-316 (1990) (applying a pluralist theory of
property justifications and outlining a metatheory to resolve conflicts between and within justificatory theories).
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thinking about property. It adds a layer to these discourses that illustrates
how individual perceptions of others' property in turn shapes the value that
individuals associate with property. This dynamic thus poses similar concerns for undermining what is welfare enhancing or well-being producing or
community reinforcing, depending on the relevant vocabulary, about property across a number of methodological and conceptual divides.
The dynamics that status signaling through property generates can raise
similar concerns for normally disparate discourses, a point that not only underscores how deeply entrenched this particular message is but also suggests
a new ground for theoretical unity. From a theoretical perspective, then, the
normative concerns that can be associated with status signaling through
property form a coherent narrative as well. The tendency to signal through
property and the status races that result can yield overinvestment in material
goods over other alternatives, yoke the individual sense of self to collective
judgments about proper levels and types of ownership and consumption, and
give power to the exclusionary critique of community.
This does not mean that the status-reinforcing aspects of property are
more central than the functions that dominate the current literature. To highlight the status-symbolic aspects of property is not to assert a new master
narrative for property theory. Nor is this to ignore the many well-theorized
and documented benefits associated with the institution of property that also
dominate contemporary discourse. But a more balanced view requires engagement with the role of property in marking, communicating, and
policing status.
IV. LEVELING AS

A NORMATIVE FRAME FOR PROPERTY DOCTRINE?

Moving beyond theory, a richer understanding of the role of property in
signaling status also provides a lens through which to consider the groundlevel operation of property law itself. Perhaps legal academics have largely
failed to engage with the work that has been done on property and status
signaling in other fields because of a perception that these dynamics grow
more of the nature of material resources and less from property in the sense
of legally cognizable entitlements. But rather than being orthogonal to the
details of doctrine, law is intimately involved in property's status-signaling
function.
As this Part explains, law at times reinforces or facilitates property's hierarchical tendencies, in intellectual property, land use, real estate, and other
areas. Conversely, law at times breaks up existing hierarchies, which is a
way to understand certain long-standing features of doctrine more traditionally explained in terms of market alienability, autonomy, and distributional
fairness. It would be challenging to plumb the depths of each of these manifestations of hierarchical signaling in the law of property, but it is significant
that a link to the symbolic aspects of status can be seen to imbue so many
different areas of doctrine.
Accordingly, although there are significant reasons to be cautious about
an overly robust state role in responding to what is troubling about status
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races played out through property, understanding the various doctrinal
threads that reinforce that dynamic may provide a basis for invoking property law to serve collectively as a moderating tool. This Part thus explores
several regulatory strategies-based in tax, information, and property lawand the potential for tempering, at least at the margins, some of what is
normatively undesirable about property's role in signaling status.
A. PropertyLaw's Status-Reinforcing Tendencies
Property law has historically played a central role in defining status in
the sense of static, rather than relative, position."' In feudal society, property
and status were formally intertwined, but even as feudal categories developed into modem property law, the law continued to play a role in defining
social status by restricting or disfavoring the terms of ownership on racial,
234
gender, and other grounds. Although this legacy continues to shape the
contemporary distribution of resources and the culture of property, modem
property law plays a more subtle if still pervasive role in undergirding the
symbolic meaning of property. In a number of core doctrinal areas, individuals invoke law to give legal sanction to, or provide fuel to participate in,
the status-symbolic aspects of property.
1. IntellectualProperty: Protecting the Value of Status Symbolism
Because property's status-signaling function is in part a question of the
communicative nature of objects and those signals can directly influence the
value of some objects, intellectual property law plays a role in giving legal
protection to the status signals associated with property. Some commentators who have engaged with the link between status signaling and
intellectual property have tended to focus on the question of incentives and
235
associated market failures. One commentator recently argued, for example, that trademark protection for products that signal status is unnecessary

233.

See supranote 2.

234. E.g., MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA XV,
14-18, 185-93 (1986) (discussing the "enforced dependence" of women with respect to property in
early American history); Spencer Overton, Racial Disparities and the Political Function of Property, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1553, 1558-59 (2002) ("[L]aws and policies that allowed confiscation of
land from Native Americans and Mexican Americans, promoted enslavement of African Americans,
and prohibited immigration from non-European countries triggered racial disparities in the control
of resources. Policies that mandated segregation in education, employment, housing, and business
exacerbated these disparities." (footnotes omitted)).
235. Some scholars have argued that greater legal protection is needed for certain statusrelated goods. E.g., Anne Theodore Briggs, Hung Out to Dry: Clothing Design Protection Pitfalls in
United States Law, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 169, 209 (2002) (discussing European competition as a ground for protecting domestic producers of fashion goods); Joseph Cockman, Note,
Running from the Runway: Trade Dress Protection in an Age of Lifestyle Marketing, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 671 (2004) (arguing that the efforts producers invest in developing "lifestyle" goods that relate
to status should merit legal protection).
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for what was described as the market for status-related goods.

236

This aspect

of trademark law was identified as legal protection for a type of information
"not about the product or service, but about the person purchasing that
product or service. 237 Similarly, in markets for luxury goods, the existence

of knockoffs (low-cost copies of status-related goods) may in fact enhance
sales (and thus incentives for production), because cheap copies actually
218

reinforce the status benefits of the original goods.
Some scholars have argued instead that intellectual property stifles consumers' ability to undermine the status orientation of certain goods."' For

example, one scholar has argued that protecting the symbolic functions of
goods through trademarks for producers of status goods and lifestyle marketers, like all legal monopolies, denies consumers the right to communicate
and freely structure their identity through the unfettered use of such symbols.24 ° Intellectual property law, the argument continues, treats the status-

symbolic aspects of material goods as an explicit-if, to some, problematic-aspect of the value of the underlying object. This is particularly
important in the market for luxury goods, although status-related advertising
permeates far beyond that particular niche.
In a role that is at times lauded, but more often critiqued, intellectual
property gives legal force to the status messages associated with important
categories of goods. It is true that this applies to a relatively narrow category
of goods, but the fact that law protects investments in the intentional produc-

tion of status markers reinforces the cultural power of those markers.2 1

236.
U.

FLA.

L.

Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trademark Law and Status Signaling: Tattoos for the Privileged, 59
REV. 195 (2007).

237. Id. at 197. As Harrison argues, trademark law functions to lower consumer search costs
by granting exclusive rights to identify the source of a product. Id. at 198. He argues that consumer
confusion associated with status-which he identifies as currently protected by the Lanham Act and
possibly by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act as well-is an illegitimate basis for legal protection.
Id. at 200-04. Returning to Leibenstein's distinction between Veblen effects and snob effects, see
supra text accompanying notes 170-72, Harrison argues that there is no economic basis for assuming the underproduction of goods that supply a demand for wealth signaling nor for goods that
depend on scarcity (although in the latter case, Harrison models one scenario in which there may be
a net consumer surplus from subsidizing this scarcity). Harrison, supra note 236, at 210-19.
238. Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property,and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1384-85 (2005).
This, to Barnett, undermines the necessity of intellectual property on incentive theories. See id. at
1412 (arguing that the "standard incentive thesis in the intellectual property literature" would anticipate incorrectly that the absence of legal protection for fashion goods would yield underproduction
of those goods, when the empirical evidence suggests that a vigorous market for such goods exists
despite extensive counterfeiting).
239. Cf Katyal, supra note 109 (exploring the ways in which consumers and others subvert
corporate control of the symbolism of property).
240. Malla Pollack, Your Image Is My Image: When Advertising Dedicates Trademarks to the
Public Domain-With an Example From the Trademark CounterfeitingAct of 1984, 14 CARDOzo L.
REV. 1391 (1993).
241. One could conceivably make a First Amendment argument that status signaling is protected speech, and thus entitled to protection from regulation. This argument seems a stretch,
though, given the attenuated nature of the message and the differences between status signaling and
the kinds of communication traditionally protected by First Amendment doctrine. Cf John
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2. Land Use and Real Property: The Place and
Physical Form of Status
Land-use law, like intellectual property, can give legal sanction to the
determinants of property-related status, although here the law may play a
more structural role.2 2 To begin with how law bolsters the status-related aspects of place and location, consider exclusionary zoning. The critique of
exclusionary zoning is well rehearsed, largely focusing on concerns such as
the actual segregation that exclusionary zoning fosters on socioeconomic,
racial, and ethnic grounds,243 as well as on the aesthetic and cultural uniformity that is said to flow from the design choices reflected in this kind of
patterning. 44 More recently, the emphasis in the critique has shifted increasingly to focus on the environmental consequences of traditional zoning,
highlighting the loss of open space and the carbon footprint associated with
245
suburban living.
But the structure of local land use can also be understood as an elaborate
legal underpinning to the physical aspects of status signaling through real
property and place. This plays out in several ways, but two primary forces
related to the physical aspects of real property and to the territoriality of
status stand out. First, of course, contemporary zoning privileges a pattern
of uses and physical design that reinforces hierarchical cultural norms. Although the city-suburb dichotomy is breaking down,246 we still tend to
privilege single-family home ownership in large measure for the symbolic
241
value it carries.
Moreover, to the extent that location is one of the prime axes along
which property can confer relative status, 248 patterns of land-use regulation
Greenman, On Communication, 106
under the law).

MICH.

L. REV. 1337, 1361-63 (2008) (defining communication

242. In land use and real property, however, legal sanction is not entirely limited to this structural role. As Stephanie Stem has argued, many aspects of residential real estate relate to the "selfexpressive capacity" that this particular resource carries-a resource that is eminently vulnerable to
symbolic manipulation. Stem, supra note 52 (manuscript at 23) (arguing against laws that "create a
fight to display a social status or income level that the owner does not necessarily possess").
243.
(1995).
244.

E.g.,

DAVID

L.

KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING, AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA

E.g., JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE: THE RISE AND DE-

(1993); cf Katharine B. Silbaugh, Women's Place:
Urban Planning, Housing Design, and Work-Family Balance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1797 (2007)
(arguing that traditional patterns of suburban land use exact a material cost on work/life balance).

CLINE

OF AMERICA'S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE

245. E.g., John R. Nolon & Jessica A. Bacher, Climate Change, Zoning and Transportation
Planning: Urbanizationas a Response to Carbon Loading, 36 REAL EST. L.J. 211 (2007).
246. Richard Briffault, Beyond City and Suburb: Thinking Regionally, 116
203 (2006), http://yalelawjoumal.org/images/pdfs/9I.pdf.

YALE

L.J.

POCKET

PART

247.

Cf CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE: SOCIAL ORDER AND LAND USE IN
70-77 (1977) (describing the "American ideal of homeownership"). As many
commentators have noted, the origins of American suburbia involved in no small measure a selfconscious movement to create and market status-ofiented environments on a broad scale. See, e.g.,
ROBERT FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS: THE RISE AND FALL OF SUBURBIA (1987); KENNETH T.
JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985).
AMERICA

248.

See supra text accompanying notes 177-78.
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that physically set off higher-status communities from lower-status communities reinforce the symbolic aspects of these spatial relations. 49 Thus
exclusion becomes not simply about isolation, but rather about engendering
and satisfying preferences for places that stand above in a symbolic sense.
Market participants, from sellers and brokers to the entire real estate industry, are well aware of this dynamic and have long played on visions of
exclusivity as a proxy for status.20
That this is culturally contingent can be seen by comparing the symbolic
aspects of suburban residential patterns with the symbolism that place carries in Europe, where proximity to urban centers carries high status and
being on the periphery signals low status. 21' This also reinforces the significance of the symbolic aspects of location; to the extent that there is a
functional underpinning to the location-status link, it is hard to see why it
makes any rational sense to choose to live further and further out from centers of employment, retail, and entertainment, given the clear diminishing
returns. Indeed, empirical work suggests an inverse relationship between
subjective well-being and length of commute, 252 yet people are choosing to
commute great distances to obtain the symbolic value associated with traditional suburban growth patterns.
Land-use regulation often privileges existing community members, who,
after all, have voice and representation in the communities, over outsiders.
This raises the cost of entry to a given status level and makes it easier for
those who have achieved a given status to maintain it.213 Although land-use
disputes are often framed as conflicts between individual property rights and
societal claims, this perspective ignores the interpersonal dynamics that can
be associated with regulating land uses to preserve status: those with status
become the "homevoters" who dominate local politiCS,2 4 and they then invoke legal protection to reinforce the symbolic aspects of their relative
position.

249.

See PERIN, supra note 247, at 210-17.
250. Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, ExclusionaryAmenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA.
L. Rav. 437, 437 (2006) ("[D]evelopers will select common amenities not only on the basis of
which amenities are inherently welfare-maximizing for the residents, but also on the basis of which
amenities most effectively deter undesired residents from purchasing homes therein.").
251. Manuel Castells, European Cities, the Informational Society, and the Global Economy,
in THE CITY READER 475,481-82 (Richard T. LeGates & Frederick Stout eds., 3d ed. 2003).
252. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., A Survey Method for CharacterizingDaily Life Experience: The Day ReconstructionMethod, 306 SCIENCE 1776 (2004) (identifying commuting as the
worst single subjective daily activity); Alois Stutzer & Bruno S. Frey, Stress That Doesn't Pay: The

Commuting Paradox,110

SCANDINAVIAN J.

ECON. 339 (2008).

253. Cf. DOUGLAS & ISHERWOOD, supra note 5, at 89 ("We have cast our argument about
goods in terms of access to information. Those who can control that access act rationally if they
seek a monopoly advantage. Their rational strategy then would be to erect barriers against entry, to
consolidate control of opportunities, and to use techniques of exclusion.").
254. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPoTHESIs: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001).
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3. Property-RelatedDebt as Fuelfor Status Races

As Claire Priest has persuasively argued, understanding the nature of
debt facilitated through
property is critical to understanding the nature of
• 255
property law itself. A critical determinant of how people are able to engage in status races through property is the contemporary democratization
of mortgage law. Roughly from the New Deal through the aftermath of the
savings-and-loan crisis, the home mortgage market was a relatively staid
backwater, with most homeowners taking out standard thirty-year fixed
mortgages and making a significant down payment. 216 Starting in the late
1990s, the mortgage market expanded significantly with the proliferation of
once-exotic products including adjustable-rate mortgages, interest-only
mortgages, and no-deposit loans. 257 While playing a part in briefly (but temporarily) facilitating the highest level of home ownership in American
history (and playing a part likewise in the more recent global credit crisis),
the availability of this expanded realm of credit fueled an arms race in home
ownership that saw the size of the average American home rise materially in
recent years.

258

This is not simply a cultural development, but rather one aided very
much by the underlying structure of mortgage law. Mortgage lawparticularly the lax regulatory structure that has, at least until recently, allowed relatively unfettered borrowing largely for consumer goods that
satisfy status needs-facilitates the use of debt for conspicuous consumption. The skew toward durable goods, with the emphasis in that market on
long-term financing, tends to reduce savings compared to consumption. 259
Moreover, the availability of leverage generally induces greater spending on
visible goods-the fact that property can generally be used as collateral with
no practical check on the application to which that collateral can be put provides critical fuel for competitive consumption. Thus mortgage law has
helped create the conditions through which status signaling has played an
increasing role in property.
B. Status Mobility in PropertyLaw: Ambiguities andAnxieties

If intellectual property, land use, and the structure of mortgage law all
reinforce or fuel status signaling, some areas of the law present a more
255. See generally Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its
Limits in American History, 120 HARv. L. REV. 385 (2006).
256. Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historicaland International Context, J. EcON. PERSP., Fall 2005, at 93, 95.
257. Creola Johnson, Stealing the American Dream: Can Foreclosure-Rescue Companies
Circumvent New Laws Designed to Protect Homeowners From Equity Theft?, 2007 Wis. L. REv.
649, 656.
258. FRANK, supra note 160, at 3 (average house built in the United States has nearly doubled
in size since the 1950s); Lin, supra note 202, at 54 n.25 (average new-home size more than doubled
from 1100 square feet in the 1950s to 2340 square feet by 2002).
259.

See Rayo & Becker, supra note 164.
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complex relationship with this phenomenon. The more that possessions signal status and hierarchy, the more the uncertainty of property rights strikes
at the stability of relative status. Foregrounding status signaling thus helps to
explain some of the anxiety that property conflicts create in contemporary
culture, particularly at critical junctures where changes in legal structure
upend relatively static status relationships.
1. Rethinking Alienability...

Law has not only been deployed to reinforce the determinants of status,
but also to create the conditions that might foster status mobility. The central
doctrinal tool traditionally associated with this mobility involves protection
of alienability. In early common law, many types of property-most centrally land-had significant restrictions on alienability, and one of the
signature aspects of the move• away
• 260 from feudalism was an abiding hostility
in land law to these restrictions. This deep theme in property law has an
ambiguous relationship to status hierarchies. On the surface, and this is how
the movement has traditionally been understood, alienability undermines
accumulations of wealth and also the literal connection between property
and power that marked land in early common law, thus undermining fixed
status hierarchies. Doctrines of alienability, however, also inject a malleability to transfers around property that is less present where categories are
stable. This allows people to treat land as a commodity, but also increases
the pressure to preserve status and also, of course, gives fuel for further accumulation.
There are other related doctrinal veins-from the destructibility of contingent remainders to the Rule in Shelley's Case to the Rule Against
Perpetuities, among others 261-that mediate the amount of control those
seeking to protect concentrated wealth can exercise, which in turn can undermine the stability of status. This is conventionally framed, again, as a
concern with alienability-allowing current holders of property to perform
exchanges that can put the• property
to its highest and best use despite the
262
wishes of earlier generations. But another way to frame the common law's
long-standing hostility to "dead-hand control" and other aspects of dynastic
control is to reframe that hostility as also concerned with creating a level
playing field in which status connected with property is fluid. 263

260.

See

261.

Id. at 240-51 (discussing common-law rules that resist dead-hand control over assets).

262.

E.g., id

DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra

note 77, at 195.

263. Battles over gentrification present another example of where alienability and the structure of entitlements disrupts established patterns of status relations, generally displacing relatively
lower-status residents with relatively higher-status residents. Thus part of the anxiety suffered by
displaced residents in gentrifying neighborhoods may have something to do with a consciousness of
this particular kind of status-related displacement. That certainly seems to underscore some of the
more heated rhetoric that abounds in these conflicts.
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Ultimately, a key rationale in property law has always been stability,
but there is a corresponding hostility to stability which troubles a number of
property theorists. If stability is linked to embedded hierarchy, this hostility
takes on a more positive cast: law can undermine the absolute nature of
property in order to temper the downsides of property's tendency to reify
status.

2... . And Inalienability
Just as increasing alienability can be both a tool to break up fixed status
and to create new status hierarchies through property, inalienabilityplacing certain potential objects of property outside the realm of commerce-holds a similar double salience to status signaling. 265 On one hand,
inalienability can be a tool to reinforce status. Anthropologists have noted
that placing commodities outside of the channels of commerce is a common
strategy that high-status groups employ to police their status boundaries. 266
Similarly, in our culture, certain goods are made artificially scarce in order
to reinforce the high-status associations with those goods. A similar dynamic plays out around many resources that we allow private parties to
exclude others from, such as club memberships and New York co-ops,
among many others. Simply refusing to sell-making a decision to render a
good inalienable-can reinforce the symbolic power of that good and in turn
the status its owner has.
On the other hand, it is possible to reinterpret some of the core distributional concerns that drive inalienability to see that preventing consumption
of a good may short-circuit a status race played out through that good. Thus,
in contemplating what would be objectionable about a market in, for example, babies or body parts, the fact that people in our culture might inevitably
tend to appropriate them into conspicuous consumption is particularly troubling. Inalienability in those contexts can be understood as a deliberate, and
appropriate, social choice to prevent status conflicts mediated through certain potential objects of property that would have especially harmful
consequences.

264. BENTHAM, supra note 27, at 111-12 (describing property as "established expectation");
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 28 (proposing a theory of property grounded in "stable ownership").
265. The literature on inalienability in legal scholarship has focused on concerns of efficiency
(reducing externalities associated with allowing certain kinds of transactions), distributional equity,
and moral qualms about debasing the objects of property, among others. See Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 37, at 1111-15; Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2009) (manuscript at 7-9, on file with author); Radin, supra note 51.
266. DOUGLAS & ISHERWOOD, supra note 5, at 140 ("Refusal to transact is such a common, if
not worldwide, strategy of exclusion that we have been able to base a cross-cultural meaning for the
notion of consumption.").
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3. Susette Kelo 's Anxiety: Eminent Domain and
the Loss of Relative Status

When the Supreme Court upheld the condemnation of the homes of
Susette Kelo and others for a redevelopment project in the small Fort
Trumbull neighborhood of New London, Connecticut, 267 the scholarly response highlighted the possible inadequacy of compensation for property so
closely tied to the homeowners' identity. The traditional measure of compensation for eminent domain has always been the fair market value of the
property, but as a number of scholars have noted, that measure ignores the
subjective value of the property, not to mention the value of the property as
part of an assembled2 6block of parcels, or the value of autonomy over decisions about property. 1
One explanation for the tenacity of some opponents to the redevelopment plan that has not gotten attention might be that dispossession risks
(and often results in) not simply the loss of the personal attachment that has
accrued to property-to the home-but also relocation to a place of relatively lower (or at least less certain) status.16 In this sense, place is not
fungible, even if home and community can be reestablished in some other
context.
This status anxiety can be seen at the margins of several other landmark
eminent domain cases. Part of the outrage that the plaintiffs in Berman v.
Parkerexpressed seems to have been over the fact that their businesses were
viable and relatively prosperous in communities that were, by all accounts,
deeply challenged." 7 In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, one senses

anxiety over loss of status in the resistance to Hawaii's program of explicit
redistribution of titles-redistribution that was directed in no small measure
271
to breaking up a land oligarchy that evinced aspects of status preservation.
Contemporary takings theory has ignored this aspect of both the regulatory
goals of eminent domain and, conversely, the harm caused by loss of status,
but it is manifest nonetheless.

267.

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).

268. E.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957,
962-67; see also Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of
Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J. Emr,. LEGAL STUD.
713 (2008) (offering experimental data on subjective valuation).
269. Cf David A. Dana, Exclusionary Eminent Domain (Northwestern Law & Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 08-06, May 6, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1129839
(exploring situations in which low-income residents displaced by eminent domain are unable to
relocate in their former neighborhoods and arguing that eminent domain undercompensates in that
situation, because an element of what condemnees value is their particular place).
270. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). This case involved a challenge by two business
owners to the District of Columbia's urban renewal program predicated on the argument that although the area of the District being condemned had many dilapidated structures, the challengers'
business was "not slum housing." Id. at 31.
271. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (involving a Public Use
Clause challenge to the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967, which allowed the transfer of title from
lessors to lessees).
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4. Status Ambiguity in OtherDoctrinal Contexts
A similar ambiguity over the connection between the security of property rights and relative status can be found in several other doctrinal
contexts, and will be mentioned briefly.
a. Adverse Possessionand the Double-Edged Sword
of Dispossession
The deep (and still active) conflicts that swirl around the ability of an
unlawful possessor to obtain title from an owner through adverse possession
can undermine the fixedness of physical possession for land and other property. This, in turn, can challenge the status associated with certain kinds of
property, with absentee landlords less able, on some accounts, to horde
property unproductively. Conversely, in some contexts, adverse possession
can give legal sanction to those shut out of traditional property arrangements. Some urban squatters, for example, are not only seeking shelter, but
also can be understood to be protesting the combination of absentee land272
lords and speculation that left significant abandoned property. When
squatters occupy abandoned property, they send a signal about the consequences of abandonment. They also send a signal, moreover, about
empowerment and the instability of fixed categories 273-a bottom-up message about dissatisfaction with relative status expressed through property.
b. The Landlord-TenantRevolution Revisited
Landlord-tenant relations typically present a classic interaction between
relatively high-status individuals (or entities) and low-status individuals. The
landlord-tenant "revolution" of the 1960s and 1970s centered around
changes that shifted power traditionally held in that relationship from land274
lords to tenants. As with other significant doctrinal shifts, it is possible to
discern an element of status anxiety in responses to the landlord-tenant revolution. Landlords are hardly a homogenous group, and assimilating someone
who rents out, say, an in-law suite in their basement with commercial landlords who own significant portfolios of units on a national scale must be
done with caution. However, some of the reaction to the doctrinal shifts empowering tenants can be seen to have destabilized the power balance
between landlords and tenants, at least in some contexts. These doctrinal
shifts changed some of the cultural significance of renting, although there is

272. See Eduardo Moises Pefialver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
1095, 1122-26 (2007).
273. See id. at 1132 ("[Tihe centrality of property to the satisfaction of fundamental human
needs... creates a strong impetus for those excluded from participation in the system of ownership
to challenge both existing property rules and established property entitlements.").
274. Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REv.517 (1984).
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still significant resonance to owning over renting that transcends the economics of the decision.

275

c. The Double Messages of Common-Interest Communities

Finally, the contemporary rise of common-interest communities is another example of the ambiguities of status playing out in legal structure. The

majority of new residential development in the United States now comes in
some form of cooperative, condominium, covenant-control community, or
7
the like, engendering a significant scholarly backlash . 276
A central ground on

which these communities are criticized-rigid adherence to community
norms, often about the external appearance of individual properties-sends

a signal to the larger world at the same that it tempers status races within the
community. Uniformly manicured homeowners-association-dominated
neighborhoods say something very clear both to residents (about their own
status and about the need to limit status races) and to outsiders (about the
status of insiders). And this dual function is given legal force through covenants and other mechanisms enforceable by insiders and practically difficult

for dissenters and outsiders to challenge.
Each of these areas of law represents either an ongoing challenge to cer-

tain status associated with property, as with absentee ownership; shifts in the
meaning associated with certain legal categories, as with the landlord-tenant
revolution's implications for the nature of being a landlord; or a complex
double message reinforcing and to some extent checking status, as with the
structure of many common-interest communities.
C. Tempering Influences: Taxation, Information, and PropertyLaw
as ComparativeRegulatory Strategies

Recognizing that law both reinforces and undermines property's hierarchical signaling underscores the intimate involvement of the state in what
might at a remove seem a private dynamic. This state involvement277is as contingent as any
and tusripe
thus re for refinement. Property
ny other
tinentas
the area
ara of
o the
th law,
la, ad
275. For discussion of the deep and varied symbolism of this tenure choice, see PERIN, supra
note 247, at 32-80.
276.

See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 77, at 817 (collecting sources).

277. To choose to focus on the state role in status signaling is not to suggest lack of interest in
the reality of material inequality or to argue that is it not vitally important for scholars to continue to
explore that inequality. Rather, it is to suggest that that field is well occupied, both in the legal academy and beyond, and that what has been missing from the discourse at least in the legal literature is
more focused examination of the symbolic overlay.
One critique of this analysis could certainly be that isolating specific doctrinal examples risks
obscuring the larger tendency of the basic system of private property to generate and reinforce inequality. Accordingly, one reaction to the link between status and property, pace Marx, would be to
restructure radically the nature of private property. Eliminating underlying material inequality would
hardly eliminate people's tendency to sort hierarchically and to signal that sorting, but there is no
doubt that it would have some effect on current dynamics around property and status signaling. For
such an argument, see PAUL A. BARAN & PAUL M. SWEEZY, MONOPOLY CAPITAL: AN ESSAY ON
THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER (1966), cited in Jim Peach & William M. Dugger,
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law has a role to play-however cautiously-in tempering what can be pernicious about status races around property. This Section accordingly
explores three potential approaches to a regulatory role. The first approach
would essentially reduce the fuel for status races, as with luxury or consumption taxes. The second, an informational approach, would regulate the
signal itself. The third, and perhaps most promising, would look to property

law to serve as a kind of firebreak-a coordination tool to check status spirals inspired by property.

To begin, common policy prescriptions for responding to the consequences of hierarchical signaling have largely focused on tax policy. 28 Thus,
for economists and economically oriented legal scholars, the primary tool to
respond to problems of dead-weight loss and over-incentivizing other-

related preference satisfaction is a consumption or "luxury" tax. 279 As applied to property more generally, this strategy would seek to undermine
status races by reducing the resources available through which to engage in

such races or by penalizing investments in specific status goods.
Taxation as a solution, however, raises a host of practical problems, particularly to do with measuring the "harm" that positional concerns might
inflict and then tracing that harm to particular individuals. Moreover, taxbased strategies to temper the property-status link are arguably misdirected.
Merely taxing the inputs to status races does little to disrupt the dynamics

that generate them and could, under certain circumstances, even reinforce
the status aspects of certain kinds of possessions, given that high price can
281
be one reason that goods convey status .
A second regulatory strategy would target the communicational aspects
of status signaling through property. One way to think about the negative
2812
consequences of this phenomenon is as a kind of information failure. On
An Intellectual History of Abundance, 40 J. ECON. ISSUES 693, 698 (2006). However, beyond the
infeasibility of such restructuring, and setting aside the libertarian objection, see ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 244-46 (1974), there are many reasons to believe that the negative
consequences that seem inevitable with change of that magnitude are enough to take the option off
the table for serious consideration. Accordingly, this Section proceeds with the assumption that any
changes in law or society that might evince sensitivity to the negative consequences of status signaling through property are going to be incremental and, perhaps, marginal in nature. That is not to
undermine their potential significance, but rather to place any such changes in appropriate context.
278. E.g., McAdams, supra note 13, at 74 (proposing taxation of status goods as a preferable
strategy over prohibition of status consumption).
279. E.g., MILL, supra note 91, at 869 (proposing a "tax on luxuries" that would target what
"is expended on indulgences" that flow from seeking to satisfy the "opinion" of others); see also
Thomas D. Griffith, ProgressiveTaxation and Happiness,45 B.C. L. REV. 1363, 1384-88, 1395-97
(2004) (discussing progressive taxation as a tool to reduce the negative externalities associated with
positional goods).
280. See Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Happinessand Public Policy: A PartialDissent (or, Why a Department of Homeland Happiness Would be a Bad Idea), 22 J.L. & POL. 283,
289-90 (2006).
281. See supra note 169. Frank has proposed a progressive consumption tax, which he argues
solves the problems associated with taxes on expenditures. FRANK, supra note 160, at 211-23. Even
a consumption tax, however, risks merely reallocating incentives toward other status goods.
282. I am grateful to Lee Fennell for suggesting informational responses to the problems
associated with status signaling through property.
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some level, people may choose to invest in certain goods over others (or in
property generically) because of misimpressions that such investment may
create. Over-leveraged homes and faux luxury goods can be understood to
convey inaccurate information, gaming the property signal.
If the problem is information failure, a solution might involve clarifying
the signal that property sends, on the theory that a more accurate message
might do less to trigger competitive consumption and related concerns.
Thus, for example, if people knew that their next-door neighbors were overleveraged in adding the 1000-square-foot addition, they might not feel quite
so compelled to keep up. Lior Strahilevitz has recounted what he calls the
reputation revolution, in which a vast amount of previously unavailable information
about strangers has become a routine part of much daily
• •
283
interaction. Thus the technology and social tools exist to peer behind the
status curtain and learn a great deal about the conditions underlying the surface-level messages that property sends. This suggests that one way to solve,
or at least mitigate, the cascades that come from at least the false signals that
attend to status would be to force more information into the system.
There are significant challenges here as well, not the least of which arise
from privacy concerns. Indeed, there is a risk that more information might
simply provide additional grounds on which to make social comparisonsthat this might be an arena where more accurate information about the material basis for inequality would reinforce the symbolic aspects of the status
associated with that inequality. Thus, if people knew more about each
other's income, debt levels, the square footage of their homes, and the like,
they might be inclined to care even more about comparisons.
This suggests, perhaps counterintuitively, that mandating less information might be a more productive approach. 2 4 As a practical matter, however,
it is the very visible nature of much property that makes it such a potent
symbol for status. 28' Efforts to directly tamp down the symbolic qualities of
property as a self-conscious regulatory effort to raise information costs
associated with the communication of relative status seem most likely to
lead to shifts to other types of signals.
There may be an intermediate state role as a norm entrepreneur in modifying the signals associated with certain types of property. If certain types of
property carry status for their relative size or far-flung location, they can just
as well carry status for, say, being carbon neutral or, as in Europe, being
close to the centei of urban life. The symbolic meaning of property is hardly
fixed.
There is reason, however, to believe that the state would tend to be a particularly clumsy symbolic regulator when it comes to status, given the
283. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1667 (2008).
284.

Cf Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J.
765, 789 (1998) (discussing law as a way to increase or decrease the cost of signal-

LEGAL STUD.

ing).
285.

See supra text accompanying notes 188-90.
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complexity and social embeddedness of signals associated with status. Were
it as simple as more property equals more status, which may be true in the
aggregate, then a consumption tax or similar solution would be the easiest
approach. But because the symbolic connection is more complex, finegrained adjustments would be required if the symbolic link were to be attacked directly.
Contrary to either what might be described as the Millian instinct to tax
the sources of status differentiation or targeting the channels of comnunication around property as an information strategy, it might be possible to
consider the structure of entitlements in property law as a third strategy.
There would be two elements to this approach. First, legal rules that disrupt
settled patterns of status may have greater merit than legal rules that tend to
ossify existing patterns of status. As discussed above, there are a number of
doctrinal areas where property rules facilitate status mobility, and while mobility will not alter the basic reality of status competition and status anxiety,
it can help create a more level playing field. There are elements of direct
redistribution that are important to this, but redistribution can also dovetail
with entitlement structures that ensure that law is not invoked to reify status.
Second, property law can more explicitly serve as what Frank described
in another context as a form of "collective protection of inconspicuous consumption.,,286 Frank pointed to a variety of policy mechanisms-from
collective bargaining agreements to worker-safety regulation and othersthat represent collective choices to privilege goods (in the economics sense)
that do not generate the kind of status associated with conspicuous con287
sumption. Property law has potential to serve in the same capacity. Thus,
land-use policies that foster economic integration, common-interest community structures that reduce visible status competition, intellectual
property rules that give greater recognition to empowered cultural consumers, and others can provide public and private legal mechanisms to
overcome the collective-action problems that lead people to jockey for relative position through property when it would be in their collective best
interest to agree to more normatively attractive alternatives.
One must be cautious about the limits of state intervention here, and the
ample history of sumptuary laws simply redirecting conspicuous consumption to other goods suggests that any change here would have to be
marginal. 289 Tamping down people's ability to strive for status through
supra note 41, at 154-61.

286.

FRANK,

287.

Id. at 161-69.

288. This could also lead to a focus on the tangible aspects of status races through property.
Some communities, for example, have begun to regulate disproportionate home sizes and renovations that take houses out of neighborhood context, see, e.g., Jessica Garrison & Cam Mia DiMassa,
Rules Limit Home Size, Hotel Conversion in LA., L.A. TIMES, May 7, 2008, at 1,and similar strategies are conceivable. This is a very direct way in which the visual impact of property can be
regulated to moderate the status signals that property sends.
289. FRANK, supra note 160, at 199-200 (discussing historical laws restricting luxury-related
expenditures and the tendency of such laws to generate "evasive" actions generally as costly as the
avoided consumption).
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property risks leading people to seek status in other ways. Some alternatives
might be normatively desirable-competing, say, to be better parents or
friends, or to produce great art or science 9---but some might yield results
that are even more troubling than the consequences of status races through
property. Certainly historically, one primary advantage of status through
property was its democratizing potential-representing a break with decidedly less fluid markers such as birth or race, even if conventional
assumptions about class mobility remain unrealistic."'

The point, however, is not to overhaul the legal system, but rather to recognize the possibilities of nudging legal change toward a more organic and
less status-influenced position. In each of these arenas, the point should not
be to radically revise the doctrine to eliminate what might be troubling
about status signaling through property, a project that would have to recognize the impracticality of the endeavor and the intractability of the dynamic.
Rather, the point should be to understand that as the law develops, a sensitivity to the risk of status races can play a part in structuring entitlements as
well as in the fine-grained application of a variety of property-related doctrines.
CONCLUSION

Every Gilded Age produces its own reflexive iconography, anxieties, and
social responses, and our recent, though now fading, one has been no different. Veblen's scathing insights about conspicuous consumption captured
something essential about the first Gilded Age over a century ago, and concerns that arise from property's role in signaling status likewise take on
particular urgency in the era of rising inequality we are now expeiencing. 29'
It may be that as our culture becomes more centered around information
and virtual realms, it will break free of the long-predominant link between
material culture and status. We may be making a transition from the world
of riches on parade described by Smith and Veblen to a more egalitarian
culture of social networking and empowered consumption. And the more
our identities can be constituted and projected through relatively inexpensive and more accessible modes of expression, the more the pressure to
290. See DE BOTTON, supra note 19, at 303 (discussing currents in philosophy, art, politics,
religion, and bohemia that although not seeking to eliminate status hierarchy, have nonetheless
sought "to institute new kinds of hierarchy based on sets of values unrecognized by, and critical of,
those of the majority").
291.
See Emily Belier & Michael Hout, IntergenerationalSocial Mobility: The United States
in Comparative Perspective, FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Fall 2006, at 19.
292. Our current level of income inequality has not been seen since the end of the Roaring
Twenties-1928, the eve of the Great Depression, to be precise. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez,
Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2003); Larry M. Bartels,
Inequalities, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, at MM22 ("The past three decades have seen a momentous
shift: The rich became vastly richer while working-class wages stagnated. Economists say that 80
percent of net income gains since 1980 went to people in the top 1 percent of the income distribution, boosting their share of total income to levels unseen since before the Great Depression.").
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compete through the accumulation and display of property may recede. Still,
the inexorable tug of the material world continues. Indeed, if anything, in
our "virtual age, the sorcery of the physical has intensified."2' 93
In the end, this Article has sought to isolate and explain property's ubiquitous tendency to be to used to communicate relative status as well as to
explore how this phenomenon intersects with property theory and property
law. The manifestation of property rights in actual objects-a specific house
in a specific neighborhood; a given make and model of car; a first edition of
a cherished book-continues to influence what the law does and means, no
matter how sophisticated an understanding of property rights as jural relationships we achieve or how ethereal the objects of property law become.
The urge to compare and to do so through our possessions is deep and abiding, but perhaps not entirely ineluctable. Understanding this aspect of what
property does on the ground provides an important window to consider the
ways in which the law reinforces this hierarchical tendency and, perhaps,
how the structure of entitlements can be reconceived to temper it.
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